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WRESTLING ANTAEUS: THE NECESSITY OF
APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CIVIL TAX
DISPUTES
I. INTRODUCTION
Greek mythology tells the story of Antaeus, who would challenge all
who passed through his land to a wrestling match.1 Without fail, Antaeus
overwhelmed every traveler he challenged. 2
One day, Antaeus
challenged Herakles—son of Zeus and hero in his own right.3 They
wrestled at great length, but each time Herakles came close to pinning
him, Antaeus became stronger and recovered in a startling fashion. 4 After
almost pinning him several times, Herakles realized Antaeus became
stronger the closer to the earth he was and lifted him up from the ground.5
Upon doing so, Antaeus became weak, allowing Herakles to finally
prevail.6
Not only was Antaeus an experienced and accomplished wrestler, but
he also enjoyed a systematic advantage: the closer he was to the earth, the
stronger he became.7 Accordingly, Antaeus’s ordinary challengers never
stood a chance.8 Even Herakles did not win easily; he simply had a fair
match.9 If, instead of falling prey to Antaeus, these ordinary travelers
were afforded a champion—a Herakles of their own to fight for them—
perhaps they would have met a better fate. At the very least they could
have had a fairer fight.
In many ways, taxpayers can face a challenge of antean proportions
when receiving a deficiency notice from the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”).10 Luckily, and for reasons likely related to why they received the
See RICHARD P. MARTIN, MYTHS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS 157 (2003); see also THOMAS
BULFINCH, BULFINCH’S MYTHOLOGY 141 (Barnes & Noble Books 2006) (1855).
2
MARTIN, supra note 1, at 157. Some accounts say Antaeus used the skulls of those he
killed to roof the temple to his father, Poseidon. Id.
3
Id. at 152–57. Herakles is best known for his labors, which made the world safe. Id. at
153. They involved, inter alia, killing the Neman lion, reclaiming a swamp taken over by a
hydra, and (worst of all) cleaning Augeas’s cow barn. Id. at 152–54.
4
Id. at 157–58.
5
MARTIN, supra note 1, at 157–58.
6
Id. at 158.
7
Id. at 157–58.
8
Id. at 148–52.
9
Id. at 157; see also BULFINCH, supra note 1, at 140–41 (telling the story of Herakles holding
the sky while Atlas retrieved the apples of Hesperides).
10
See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An
Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1235, 1281–82 (2006) (finding the difference between litigated outcomes of tax disputes with
experienced attorneys is significantly better for the taxpayer than representing themselves
pro se).
1
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notice to begin with, many of these taxpayers have money to hire their
own Herakles to fight on their behalf. 11 This is the task of tax attorneys—
to ensure a fair dispute between the IRS and the taxpayer.12 However, not
all taxpayers may have the money to hire counsel to represent them. 13 In
these cases, the adjudication process may not be as fair as we would
hope.14
It is for this reason this Note argues the Tax Court should appoint
counsel to indigent taxpayers, even though it is a civil court dealing
exclusively in monetary judgments.15 First, Part II discusses the
background of tax law as well as the law governing when it is appropriate
for a court to appoint counsel to a litigant.16 Part III applies the standards
used for counsel appointment to indigent taxpayers before the Tax
Court.17 Part III argues that, to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause—or alternatively as a discretionary measure to protect against
unjust government takings—the Tax Court should appoint counsel to
indigent pro se taxpayers before it.18

See William H. Ise, Comment, The Relationship Between Civil and Criminal Tax Fraud and
its Effect on the Taxpayer’s Constitutional Rights, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1176, 1190 (1971)
(querying whether taxpayers suspected of tax evasion could be indigent, presumably
because evading taxes would have afforded them some assets).
12
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (A.B.A. 2016) (detailing a
lawyer’s responsibility to serve as an advocate by asserting the client’s position under the
rules of the adversary system).
13
See IRS, Low Income Taxpayer Clinics, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV. (May 4, 2016),
https://www.irs.gov/Advocate/Low-Income-Taxpayer-Clinics
[https://perma.cc/
M9AN-9S7Q] [hereinafter Low Income Taxpayer Clinics] (detailing the IRS’s Low Income
Taxpayer Clinic (“LITC”) program which provides federal funds to legal clinics that offer
representation to low income taxpayers at no or low cost).
14
Cf. Lederman & Hrung, supra note 10, at 1281 (finding a significant advantage in
litigated disputes before the Tax Court attributable to experienced counsel). An advantage
in litigation alone does not necessarily speak to fundamental fairness of proceedings, but
may where the proceedings begin to resemble a government taking without fair
representation. Id. See also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25–27 (1981) (discussing
the due process requirement of “fundamental fairness”).
15
See infra Part III (applying due process standards to the potential appointment of
counsel to indigent taxpayers before the Tax Court).
16
See infra Part II (providing a general background of tax law and of law used to appoint
counsel to indigent litigants: namely, the Sixth Amendment, the Due Process Clauses, and
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)).
17
See infra Part III (canvassing Supreme Court precedent regarding the right to appointed
counsel and applying it to taxpayers before the Tax Court).
18
See infra Part III (arguing generally that the Tax Court should appoint counsel to
indigent taxpayers before it, either in compliance with the Due Process Clause or federal
statutory discretion).
11
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II. BACKGROUND
The development of tax law in the United States has been both
complicated and controversial.19 Even in today’s divisive political climate,
the necessity of tax reform appears to be a subject that gathers widespread
support, implying that no one is happy with it.20 The complexity of the
tax code can be fairly attributed to a number of factors, but a discussion of
the development of the tax system may aid in its understanding.21 Part
II.A provides a basic overview of the evolution of tax law in the United
States while Part II.B explains when courts may appoint counsel to
litigants.22
A. General Overview of Tax Law
Throughout its development in the United States, tax law has not
always enjoyed extraordinary clarity in its pronouncement and
See JOSEPH P. CROCKETT, THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1955)
(describing the development of multiple forms of taxation in the United States); Erik M.
Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of “Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1057, 1169–73 (2001) (discussing the development and adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment providing for the federal income tax).
20
See Rand Paul, Blow up the Tax Code and Start over, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/blow-up-the-tax-code-and-start-over-1434582592
[https://perma.cc/H2BH-BE8X] (concluding that “the tax code has grown so corrupt,
complicated, intrusive and antigrowth that . . . the system isn’t fixable[]”); Reforming the Tax
HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/reform/tax-reform
Code,
WHITE
[https://perma.cc/H3ZB-8E8Z] (detailing President Obama’s suggestions for
“comprehensive tax reform”); Tax Reform That Will Make American Great Again, DONALD J.
TRUMP
FOR
PRESIDENT,
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/positions/tax-reform
[https://perma.cc/Q6Q2-Z5QL] (giving details on a plan to simplify the tax code); Why
Reform the Tax Code?, TAXREFORM.GOV, https://taxreform.gov/why-reform.html
[https://perma.cc/882J-CJ9F] (describing the tax code as “broken”).
21
See William G. Gale & Janet Holtzblatt, The Role of Administrative Issues in Tax Reform:
Simplicity, Compliance, and Administration, in UNITED STATES TAX REFORM IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 6–7 (George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski eds. 2008) (identifying three
factors that explain why tax systems are complex as: (1) “conflict among the consensus goals
of tax policy,” (2) “the political process,” and (3) “the ability and willingness of taxpayers to
avoid or evade taxes”; see also Michael J. Boskin, Introduction: Taxation and the Role of
Government in the Economy, in FEDERAL TAX REFORM: MYTHS AND REALITIES 25 (Michael J.
Boskin ed. 1978) (describing complicated development of tax policy: “Our tax system has
evolved historically through a series of compromises and reforms which have attempted, on
the one hand, to achieve some level of efficiency and equity while raising a given revenue
and, on the other, have reflected important political forces embodied in special interest
groups. But the underlying economic forces which determine the desirability of specific
features of our tax laws have changed markedly through time.”).
22
See infra Part II.A–B (explaining the general background of tax in the United States and
the case law surrounding appointment of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and Due
Process Clauses).
19
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application; this section attempts to explain some of it.23 First, Part II.A.1
provides a history and overview of tax enforcement in the United States.24
Part II.A.2 then shifts to adjudication and provides a general explanation
of how the Tax Court operates.25
1.

Tax Enforcement

Taxation, as it developed in the Anglo-American legal tradition, wore
many hats: some traditional methods of collecting revenue were
structured as payments for services provided.26 Others were enforced
through aggressive market controls, which left smuggling as the only
categorical method of tax evasion.27 Many were enforced with a feudal
claim to seize property in the event of nonpayment. 28 Some “taxes” were
even voluntary.29 Most federal taxes were enforced administratively

See CROCKETT, supra note 19, at 3 (discussing how the “lack of integration and
coherence” of pre-1939 taxation laws “fostered litigation and was an impediment to orderly
administration”).
24
See infra Part II.A.1 (describing the history and development of tax law and of tax
enforcement).
25
See infra Part II.A.2 (describing the history and development of the U.S. Tax Court).
26
See Duties in America (Stamp) Act, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1765) (raising the cost of government
documents such as, inter alia, court pleas, motions, and petitions; licenses; letters of mark;
and grants of land); see also Justin DuRivage & Claire Priest, The Stamp Act and the Political
Origins of American Legal and Economic Institutions, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 876–77 (2015)
(describing the Stamp Act’s establishment of taxes on “institutional services”).
27
See Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts (Part I), 26 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 581, 591 (1995) (outlining the aims of Navigation Acts as controlling imperial
commerce, establishing England as a trade entrepot for the colonies, and aiding and
maintaining English shipping). Virginia, for example, collected significant tax revenues from
the production and marketing of tobacco. William E. Nelson, Law and the Structure of Power
in Colonial Virginia, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 843 (2014). These market controls made it illegal
to import or export any goods by any means other than through an English-controlled port.
Id. The tax, then, was the import or export duty. Id. The punishment for evading the tax
was prosecution for the crime of smuggling, which was not necessarily a tax crime. Id.
28
See 1 PHILLIP ALEXANDER BRUCE, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF VIRGINIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE MATERIAL CONDITION OF THE PEOPLE, BASED UPON ORIGINAL
AND CONTEMPORANEOUS RECORDS 569 (1896) (explaining how the failure to pay feudal quitrents resulted in the repossession of land to whomever received the conveyance under
patent); see generally Beverly W. Bond, Jr., The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies, 17
AM. HIST. REV. 496, 496–98 (1912) (explaining the early quit-rent system in American
Colonies).
29
See ALVIN RABUSHKA, TAXATION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 723 (2008) (“Colonial assistance
to Britain during the French and Indian War relied on voluntary requisitions of the separate
colonies, encouraged by promises of British reimbursement.”). Another example of a tax
with enforcement contemplated on the voluntary cooperation of citizens is the Navigation
Act of 1651, which granted citizen informants a half share in the proceeds from any seizure.
THOMAS C. BARROW, TRADE AND EMPIRE: THE BRITISH CUSTOMS SERVICE IN COLONIAL
AMERICA 11 (1967).
23
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through control of port operations.30 Taxes were often levied against some
form of property that acted as collateral, and collection was generally
limited to property that went through government-controlled areas (e.g.,
ports, town gates) or was granted to an individual (e.g., real property,
licenses, charters).31 These enactments bound the collection of tax
inseparably from other, non-tax, claims of right.32 This makes a direct
comparison between older tax structures and contemporary
understandings of a tax system somewhat difficult.33 This murky
historical line in classifying and enforcing taxation has extended to some
difficulty in categorizing the contemporary tax scheme. 34 Today,
however, the IRS enforces a more categorically-defined tax system.35 Civil
audits, conducted by IRS agents, investigate potential civil deficiencies in
tax payment.36 Criminal audits, conducted by the Criminal Investigative
Division (“CID”), investigate potential tax crimes.37 If a criminal

See BARROW, supra note 29, at 11 (describing port-based controls, including required
registration of ships with port officials and posting bond to guarantee compliance with
commodity controls).
31
See id. at 5–6 (describing some English laws regulating colonial commerce, such as the
Navigation Acts which only allowed import or export on ships owned and manned by
English subjects).
32
See The Cleopatra, 5 F. CAS. 1029, 1029 (E.D.N.Y. 1871) (sustaining a forfeiture of a ship
for smuggling because the crew evaded an import duty). Taxes enforced through
incarceration were often not classified strictly as tax crimes, but were tied to government
control of some other area. Id. Another problem arises when attempting to classify port
taxes in that they were governed under admiralty law, but that lies far outside the scope of
this Note. See The Mary J. Vaughan, 16 F. CAS. 991, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1867) (analyzing
complications that arose between varying valuation methods when shipments of goods sunk
before delivering their cargo).
33
See United States v. Certain Diamonds, 30 F. 364, 365 (N.D. Ill. 1887) (seizing diamonds
where owner smuggled them into the country to avoid paying duties). Smuggling, for
example, was a crime and was even recognized as an attempt to defraud the revenue of the
United States, but was prosecuted as the independent crime of smuggling and not as criminal
tax fraud. Id.
34
See infra Part II.A (discussing blurred lines between contemporary civil and criminal
enforcement, and in Tax Court, classification and oversight).
35
See Edward L. Froelich, United States, in THE TAX DISPUTES AND LITIGATION REVIEW 327,
329–30 n.7 (Simon Whitehead ed., 2d ed. 2014) (giving a general overview of the U.S. tax
reporting and enforcement system).
36
See I.R.C. § 6201 (2014) (authorizing the IRS to make “inquiries, determinations, and
assessments of all taxes . . . under internal revenue law[s]”); § 7602 (authorizing the IRS to
examine any books, records, papers, or other relevant data or material belonging to the
taxpayer or third parties); Froelich, supra note 35, at 331 (describing the general structure and
purpose of audits, the different kinds of audits, and the process through which an audit
progresses).
37
See Froelich, supra note 35, at 329–30 n.7 (detailing broad differences between civil and
criminal audit procedure).
30
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investigation ripens sufficiently, the CID may refer the matter to the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for prosecution.38
Yet not all aspects of tax law prove that clean-cut in practice.39 Tax
fraud, for example, straddles the worlds of civil and criminal law. 40 In
theory, civil tax fraud and criminal tax fraud are two distinct offenses with
different penalties.41 The elements for each violation are not only
“inherently intertwined,” however, but identical.42 When the IRS
investigates the potential of criminal misconduct, it necessarily examines
the appropriateness of a civil liability.43 By no means is this an accident.44
The legislative history behind the Internal Revenue Code supports the
conclusion that Congress intended to design a system with interrelated
civil and criminal elements.45 In fact, the 1939 Code contemplated the use
of the IRS’s summons authority in criminal as well as civil investigations.46
Moreover, Congress has not categorized tax fraud investigations into civil
Id.
Id.
40
See infra Part II.A.1.a (describing tax fraud as an example of blurred civil and criminal
tax enforcement).
41
See United States v. Univ. Sav. Ass’n, 666 F.2d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1982) (explaining the
general structure of tax fraud).
42
See id. (“Congress has created a law enforcement system in which the criminal and civil
elements of tax liability are inherently intertwined.”); Moore v. United States, 360 F.2d 353,
356 (4th Cir. 1965) (“[W]hile the criminal evasion statute does not explicitly require a finding
of fraud, the case-by-case process of construction of the civil and criminal tax provisions has
demonstrated that their constituent elements are identical.”); Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334
F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1964) (“From examining the components of [civil and criminal tax
fraud] it can readily be seen that ‘willful’ includes all the elements of ‘fraud.’ The difference
[between civil and criminal tax fraud], if any, is in the greater degree of bad motive or evil
purpose required under criminal prosecution; both require a wrongful intent to deprive the
Government of taxes owing it.”). The elements of both civil and criminal tax fraud are: (1)
an affirmative act constituting an attempt to evade or defeat taxes, (2) willfulness, and (3)
additional tax due as a result. Ise, supra note 11, at 1177. Civil penalties for tax fraud are
limited to payment of the unpaid amount due to the IRS in addition to interest of varying
rates. I.R.C. § 6651 (2014). Criminal penalties, over and above requiring the repayment of
whatever tax was due, allows for additional fines, requiring the defendant to pay for the
costs of prosecution, and imprisonment. § 7201.
43
See Univ. Sav. Ass’n, 666 F.2d at 314 (describing the interrelated nature of civil and
criminal tax fraud). The court explained that statute definitionally bundles a civil penalty
into in a criminal fraud conviction. Id. Part of the penalty incurred when committing
criminal fraud is thus a civil penalty. Id.
44
See United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 310–11 (1978) (discussing
Congress’s design of a system of civil and criminal tax fraud that are necessarily intertwined
to ensure enforcement and deterrence, including the overlapping elements of both as well as
statutory authorizations of the summons power); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,
535–36 (1971) (analyzing the intent of Congress when designing a system with intertwined
civil and criminal aspects).
45
LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. at 310–12.
46
Id.
38
39
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and criminal components.47 Instead, the civil and criminal aspects of an
investigation are placed entirely at the discretion of the IRS, and only
begin to diverge when the IRS recommends criminal prosecution to the
DOJ.48 It is only at that point the IRS loses any amount of discretion
regarding whether to pursue a civil penalty, a criminal penalty, both, or
neither.49 But even after recommendation to the DOJ, the civil and
criminal elements of the investigation do not completely separate.50 In
fact, the only things that substantially change when the IRS recommends
prosecution to the DOJ is (1) the IRS can no longer prevent the DOJ from
prosecuting and (2) the IRS loses its ability to compromise the criminal
aspect of the fraud case.51 It is not uncommon for civil assessments to
become criminal investigations, nor for failed criminal investigations to be
given another shot as civil assessments.52 This is partly because the IRS
47
Id. at 310. For example, Congress stated, “[e]very collector within his collection district
shall see that all laws and regulations relating to the collection of internal revenue taxes are
faithfully executed and complied with, and shall aid in the prevention, detection, and
punishment of any frauds in relation thereto.” Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 3654(a)). To effectuate
that responsibility, the statute then gave collectors all powers under a section contemplating
both fine and imprisonment. Id. At no point in the statute does Congress distinguish
between civil and criminal law regarding offenses, penalties, or otherwise. Id.
48
LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. at 310; see Paul P. Lipton, The Relationship Between the Civil
and Criminal Penalties for Tax Frauds, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 527, 530 (1968) (laying out the IRS’s
available choice of sanctions regarding tax fraud cases, along with the accompanying
procedure).
49
See Lipton, supra note 48, at 530 (discussing the IRS’s choice of available sanctions for
tax fraud).
50
See LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. at 311–12 (distinguishing when a civil investigation
transforms into a criminal prosecution, going as far as stating that “Congress has not
categorized tax fraud investigations into civil and criminal components.”).
51
See id. at 312 (explaining that the IRS cannot try its own criminal prosecutions—that is
a power reserved for the Justice Department); I.R.C. § 7122(a) (2014) (“The Secretary [of the
Treasury] may compromise any civil or criminal case arising under the internal revenue laws
before reference to the Department of Justice for prosecution or defense; and the Attorney
General or his delegate may compromise any such case after reference to the Department of
Justice for prosecution or defense.”).
52
See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968) (explaining that “tax investigations
frequently lead to criminal prosecutions,” and holding that res judicata did not bar the
assessment of a civil fraud penalty when the taxpayer was acquitted on a charge of criminal
tax fraud for the same act). The Court stated:
In fact, the last visit of the revenue agent to the jail [holding the
defendant in Mathis] took place only eight days before the full-fledged
criminal investigation concededly began. And as the investigating
revenue agent was compelled to admit, there was always the possibility
during his investigation that his work would end up in a criminal
prosecution.
Id. See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400–04 (1938) (affirming the constitutionality
of the dual nature of tax fraud enforcement); Ise, supra note 11, at 1178–79 (noting that this
allows both civil and criminal penalties to be imposed in every case of tax evasion, and going
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does not know exactly what an audit will uncover at the outset; it is
difficult to know which audits will ultimately result in civil assessments
and which will end in prosecution.53
However, when the IRS ultimately chooses not to pursue criminal
prosecution—thereby avoiding the Sixth Amendment requirement to
adequate counsel—it still benefits from a systematic advantage in civil
litigation.54 A large proportion of Tax Court defendants are pro se, and
representation by counsel has been shown to significantly improve a
taxpayer’s chances of success, at least on cases that go to trial.55
on to discuss when Miranda warnings should attach and whether information obtained
through administrative subpoena may be used in criminal prosecution). Current policy
objectives of the IRS result in the criminal aspects of an investigation to be given priority over
civil aspects of the same investigation. See United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278 F. Supp. 525, 536–
37 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (quoting IRS Audit Division Manual, Ch. 4500, P-4560-3 (approved March
2, 1960)) (noting IRS policy to consider the imposition of criminal sanctions in the cases
selected for prosecution “paramount” in relation to the civil tax aspects of the cases because
attempts to prosecute both aspects of a case have shown to “seriously militate” against
success with respect to either); see also LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. at 308–11 (analyzing at
which point a civil audit can become a criminal investigation); Lipton, supra note 48, at 532
(suggesting that “the [IRS] policy of holding the civil phase in abeyance may reflect the
inherent unfairness and possible constitutional doubt involved in the commingling of civil
and criminal investigations”).
53
Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4. From a due process perspective, it is generally more worrisome
that in a criminal prosecution, the Justice Department can rely on evidence obtained through
less-procedurally-restrictive civil means, thereby bypassing the Fifth Amendment’s selfincrimination protection. See, e.g., United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785, 790 (2d Cir. 1968)
(affirming the admittance and use of evidence found during a civil audit to convict a
taxpayer of criminal tax fraud because the IRS did not contemplate criminal prosecution
when it received the records); but see Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4 (reversing a conviction of criminal
tax fraud because the lower court admitted evidence obtained while the defendant was in
custody for an unrelated offense). The case law regarding when to give Miranda warnings
after the investigation becomes criminal in nature seems to mostly focus on whether the
government has custody over the taxpayer, not whether he is being investigated criminally.
See, e.g., Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4 (focusing on whether the taxpayer was in government custody
when evidence was received in determining whether it could be used in the criminal
prosecution); Squeri, 398 F.2d at 790 (using the custody analysis); but see United States v.
Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D.D.C. 1965) (holding that “the Government may not bring a
parallel civil proceeding and avail itself of civil discovery devices to obtain evidence for
subsequent criminal prosecution,” and noting that defendant’s conviction could likely be
overturned because the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) elicited testimony
from the defendant after recommending criminal prosecution but not informing the
defendant).
54
Lederman & Hrung, supra note 10, at 1281–82. Professor Lederman found the IRS
enjoys a statistically-significant advantage in litigated outcomes against pro se litigants that
does not exist when taxpayers are represented by counsel. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend.
VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense”).
55
Lederman & Hrung, supra note 10, at 1237 n.14. The IRS data shows that 46.01% of
taxpayers were pro se defendants in cases other than small tax cases (“S cases”), and
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Thus, the IRS’s wide discretion to pursue a matter civilly or criminally
turns the enforcement process into a continuous system rather than a truly
dichotomous one.56 A case that meets the “evil motive” requirements for
criminal investigation, but where the IRS does not believe the criminal
standard of proof can be met, may simply be pursued as a civil matter.57
By shifting to civil investigation, the IRS can lower its standards of proof,
deny the defendant’s guarantee of representation, and significantly
increase its chance of prevailing before the Tax Court.58 This wide
discretion and ambiguous distinction between civil and criminal tax fraud
have been accused of eroding the traditional distinction between civil and

Lederman’s analysis of empirical data demonstrated a statistically-significant advantage in
litigated outcomes for represented defendants. Id. This means 46.01% of taxpayers before
the Tax Court are brought there by the government while suffering a systematic
disadvantage in advocating for their interests. Id. at 1281. Professor Lederman’s data failed
to show that representation provided a significant advantage one way or another for settled
disputes. Id. Lederman suggests that the procedural complexity in Tax Court proceedings—
which does not extend to negotiation with the IRS—is a likely explanation for this
discrepancy. Id. Litigated outcomes also correlated not only with representation generally,
but also with the experience of the attorney representing the defendant. Id. Lederman noted
the likelihood that some of the demonstrated effect is likely due to the procedural complexity
of tax litigation, which makes it difficult for a pro se defendant to fully and effectively
advocate for his interests. Lederman & Hrung, supra note 10, at 1237 n. 14.
56
See United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847, 854 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (“[The] CCH
Federal Tax Service Release . . . indicates that Special Agents of the Intelligence Division are
now required at first interrogation to read to a taxpayer a ‘Statement of Rights: which
contains the substance of the constitutional admonition specified in Miranda.’”). This
unnecessary statement of right given by the IRS at the entry of its Special Agent may very
well have arisen as an acknowledgement of the fuzzy line between civil and criminal
procedures. See Ise, supra note 11, at 1190 (“The IRS apparently has indicated, either as a
precaution against judicial disfavor or because it too recognizes that there might be some
merit to the application of Miranda, that some warnings should be given to the taxpayer
when the special agent enters the case.”). The introduction of the Special Agent happens
before the assessment technically becomes a criminal investigation, but does indicate the
IRS’s intention to look at the situation criminally. See id. at 1185–86 (“[T]he accusatory stage
is not reached until arrest or indictment occurs.”). Since 1967, the Service has, however, only
required its special agents to give the first three Miranda warnings upon entering the case.
Id. at 1190. Interestingly, the fourth, that an indigent accused is entitled to state-appointed
counsel, is not given. Id.
57
See id. at 1179 (using “evil motive” and “bad purpose” to describe requirements of
criminal prosecution); see also Lipton, supra note 48, at 534–35 (explaining that, while courts
used to simply allow a criminal conviction of tax fraud to be used as evidence of a civil fraud
issue, collateral estoppel now bars taxpayers from contesting the imposition of a civil fraud
penalty at all after being convicted of tax evasion).
58
See Lederman & Hrung, supra note 10, at 1281–82 (showing a significant advantage to
representation in litigated tax outcomes). If pursuing civil enforcement rather than criminal
prosecution can take that advantage away from the taxpayer, the IRS may be incentivized to
make that strategic choice in close cases where the taxpayer may not have the funds to hire
an attorney. Id.
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criminal law.59 Practically, however, this blurred line between criminal
and civil fraud is necessary to ensure enforcement.60
In the event the IRS determines a taxpayer owes a civil deficiency, and
the taxpayer wishes to dispute it, the taxpayer has a couple of options.61
First, the taxpayer has the option of paying the tax and bringing an action
against the IRS for return of the money, arguing that he did not properly
owe it in taxation.62 If the taxpayer follows this route, he may bring his
claim against the IRS for repayment in the Court of Federal Claims or a
district court.63 If the taxpayer wishes to dispute the claimed tax before
59
See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 6–8 (1968) (White, J. dissenting) (calling the
Court’s determination that criminal aspects of an investigation attach when the taxpayer is
in custody “troubling”); cf. id. (holding that a taxpayer had a right to Miranda warnings
regarding a tax investigation before the IRS considered criminal prosecution because the
taxpayer was in police custody for an unrelated investigation).
60
See United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 310–11 (1978) (analyzing the nature
of a system with inherently-intertwined civil and criminal aspects); Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 535 (1971) (discussing Congress’s intent in designing a system with
intertwined civil and criminal aspects). This Note is explicitly not arguing that civil and
criminal tax litigation should be merged or otherwise treated the same way. Instead, this
Note seeks to recognize that the line between the two in tax enforcement is less clear than in
other areas of law, and that the emergence of holes in the dividing line may require effusion
of some legal concepts across that line. See Mathis, 391 U.S. at 6–8 (White, J. dissenting)
(commenting on the problem involved in deciding a taxpayer was entitled to criminal
Miranda warnings where the IRS agents were not pursuing criminal prosecution). The
Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this erosion of the dichotomy between civil and
criminal law within tax enforcement in Mathis. Id. The court has not done anything to further
break down the distinction, nor should it. Id.
61
See Leandra Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835,
1836–37 (2014) (describing taxpayer options for contesting an assessment of civil tax
deficiency).
62
Id.
63
Id. The Court of Federal Claims and United States District Courts have largely
concurrent jurisdiction with disputes before the United States Tax Court, though the Tax
Court hears over ninety-five percent of litigated federal tax cases. David Laro, The Evolution
of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 18 (1995). This likely has
something to do with the Tax Court’s status as the only forum in which a taxpayer can litigate
a deficiency before paying it. See Lederman, supra note 61, at 1836–37 (“[O]nly in the Tax
Court can a taxpayer avoid paying the claimed tax before litigating”); see also J. MARTIN
BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 6 (11th ed. 2015) (describing
the Tax Court as the “poor person’s court” because the taxpayer can commence an action for
redetermination of a deficiency without first paying the asserted deficiency). One important
distinction between the Court of Federal Claims and District Court lies in appellate
jurisdiction. See Lederman, supra note 61, at 1837–41 (describing which courts may review
the Tax Court’s decisions and what standard of review they must use). Judgments rendered
by district courts are appealed to their respective circuit court, whereas those rendered by
the Court of Federal Claims are appealed to the federal circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)
(“The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States”); id. § 1295(a)(3) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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paying it, however, he has but one option: he must bring his case before
the Tax Court.64
2.

The United States Tax Court

In many ways, and much to the chagrin of numerous tax scholars, the
Tax Court is an exceptional federal court.65 It is a trial court located in
Washington, D.C., that conducts trials nationwide.66 Its decisions are
appealed to all the regional courts of appeal and its judges are appointed
in much the same way as Article III judges, but they serve fifteen-year
terms.67 It elects its own Chief Judge, and its Special Trial Judges serve the
Chief Judge at-will, unlike federal magistrates at district court.68 These
administrative idiosyncrasies can be partially explained by the Court’s
history and development.69 Congress first established the Board of Tax
Appeals as an independent executive agency in 1924.70 It was primarily
created to adjudicate disputes arising out of the changed structure of

shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from a final decision of the United States
Court of Federal Claims.”).
64
See Kaffenberger v. United States, 314 F.3d 944, 958 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Full payment of a
tax assessment is a prerequisite to suit in federal district court; taxpayers may bring
prepayment suits only in United States Tax Court.”).
65
See Leandra Lederman, Restructuring the U.S. Tax Court: A Reply to Stephanie Hoffer and
Christopher Walker’s The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2014)
[hereinafter Lederman, Restructuring] (discussing the Tax Court and tax exceptionalism).
66
See 42 U.S.C. § 7445 (1954) (“The principal office of the Tax Court shall be in the District
of Columbia. . . .”). “The Tax Court, [like the Court of Federal Claims,] has nationwide
jurisdiction over taxpayers[,] regardless of where [they reside].” Laro, supra note 63, at 23.
67
See I.R.C. § 7482(a) (1997) (“The United States Courts of Appeals (other than the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the Tax Court . . . .”). In contrast, the Court of Federal Claims, which also
has trial-level jurisdiction over certain federal tax cases, has its decisions appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2012) (“The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal
from a final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims . . . .”); § 7443(b) (1954)
(“Judges of the Tax Court shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.”); § 7443(e) (“The term of office of any judge of the Tax Court shall
expire [fifteen] years after he takes office.”).
68
See § 7444(b) (“The Tax Court shall at least biennially designate a judge to act as chief
judge.”); § 7443A(a) (“The chief judge may, from time to time, appoint special trial judges
who shall proceed under such rules and regulations as may be promulgated by the Tax
Court.”); 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (2010) (“The appointment of any individual as a full-time
magistrate judge shall be for a term of eight years, and the appointment of any individuals
as a part-time magistrate judge shall be for a term of four years . . . .”).
69
See Lederman, supra note 65, at 8–23 (detailing the historical development of the Tax
Court).
70
HAROLD DUBROFF & BRANT J. HELLWIG, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 49 (2d ed. 2014).
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federal tax, which existing institutions were ill-equipped to handle.71 In
1942, the Board was renamed the “Tax Court of the United States.” 72 In
the years to come, there would be several attempts to designate the Tax
Court as an Article III court, but these would ultimately prove
unsuccessful.73 Instead, in 1969, the Tax Court of the United States was
renamed the “United States Tax Court” and was officially denominated as
an Article I court rather than an independent agency.74
Yet the reclassification did not significantly alter the Tax Court’s
activities, which were already largely judicial. 75
Nor did the
reclassification make an admittedly judicial body part of the judicial
branch, despite it carrying the title of a court and wielding the power of
contempt.76 The Supreme Court has held that the Tax Court exercises
judicial power, that its function and role closely resemble federal district
See id. at 1 (explaining that the Tax Court originated in part in response to “the
inadequacy of preexisting institutions, both administrative and judicial, for adjudicating in
an acceptable manner the disputes growing out of the changed conditions brought on by the
new taxes”).
72
Id. at 184.
73
Id. at 20–40. One issue deemed important in these debates was who would be entitled
to represent taxpayers before the Tax Court. Id. at 193–94. Non-attorneys had been
permitted to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals, and it was thought that designating
the Tax Court as an Article III court would change this, only allowing attorneys to argue
before it. See id. at 193 (“[D]ating back to 1924, only lawyers and certified public accountants
were eligible to represent taxpayers before the Board . . . .”). In fact, the debates seemed
primarily concerned with this issue of who could practice before the court. Leandra
Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1195, 1204 (2008) [hereinafter Lederman, Tax Appeal].
74
I.R.C. § 7441 (1954); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730.
There has been some discussion as to whether the Tax Court is even constitutional, both
specifically as it exists and fundamentally as a court under Article I. See Deborah A. Geier,
The Tax Court, Article III, and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Committee: A
Study in Applied Constitutional Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 985, 985 (1991); Daniel L. Ginsberg,
ls the Tax Court Constitutional?, 35 MISS. L.J. 382 (1963). Practically speaking, it is highly
unlikely that the Supreme Court would consider whether the Tax Court is an
unconstitutional legislative encroachment on the judicial power so many years after its
creation and prolonged operation. Diane L. Fahley, The Tax Court’s Jurisdiction over Due
Process Collection Appeals: Is it Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 453, 456 (2003).
75
See Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1205 n.72 (quoting Harold Dubroff, Federal
Taxation, 1973 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 265, 272 (1973)) (“The Tax Court was given the authority to
‘punish contempt of its authority by fine or imprisonment, and provided that in carrying out
its powers the court should have the same assistance as is provided generally to federal
courts.’”); see also Tax Reform Act § 956, 83 Stat. 732 (amending I.R.C. § 7456(d) and granting
the Tax Court the contempt power). In addition to Congress regarding the Tax Court as a
traditional federal court, it is also indicative of its position—despite being classified as an
Article I court—that the Supreme Court has held the Tax Court to be a “court of law” in
certain instances. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 890–91 (1991).
76
See Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1205 n.72 (describing the Tax Court’s receipt
of the contempt power).
71
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courts, that it exercises its judicial power in much the same way as federal
district courts exercise theirs, and even that it qualifies as a “Court of
Law.”77
Despite all of these ways in which the Tax Court resembles an Article
III court, it does operate differently in some respects. 78 Article III provides
77
See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891–92 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (analyzing the status and power of the Tax Court). Scalia ultimately concluded
that:
The Tax Court’s function and role in the federal judicial scheme closely
resemble those of the federal district courts, which indisputably are
“Courts of Law.” Furthermore, the Tax Court exercises its judicial
power in much the same way as the federal district courts exercise
theirs. It has authority to punish contempts by fine or imprisonment, 26
U.S.C. § 7456(c); to grant certain injunctive relief, § 6213(a); to order the
Secretary of the Treasury to refund an overpayment determined by the
court, § 6512(b)(2); and to subpoena and examine witnesses, order
production of documents, and administer oaths, § 7456(a). All these
powers are quintessentially judicial in nature . . . The Tax Court’s
exclusively judicial role distinguishes it from other non-Article III
tribunals that perform multiple functions and provides the limit on the
diffusion of appointment power that the Constitution demands.
Id. But see id. at 912 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing
that “[w]hen the Tax Court was statutorily denominated an ‘Article I Court’ in 1969, its
judges did not magically acquire the judicial power. They still lack life tenure; their salaries
may still be diminished; they are still removable by the President for ‘inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office’ . . . How anyone with these characteristics can exercise judicial
power ‘independent . . . [of] the Executive Branch’ is a complete mystery”); see also id. at 888–
90 (examining the history of the Tax Court and determining it fits within the definition of a
“court of law,” at least for the purposes of the appointments clause).
78
See id. at 912 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (questioning
how officers fully-answerable to the Executive and Legislative powers could exercise
independent judicial power); see also Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1211–12
(discussing the extra-judicial incentives faced by the Tax Court). Professor James Pfander
has argued that Article III “courts” and Article I “tribunals” are not actually the same. See
James Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States,
118 HARV. L. REV. 645, 652–55 (2004) (discussing the interplay between Article III courts and
legislative tribunals, and advancing a substantive distinction between the two to clarify their
relationship). This distinction would delineate Congress’s power to create Article III courts
inferior to the Supreme Court from its power to create inferior tribunals for adjudication
under Article I. See id. at 775–76 (comparing the “inferior tribunals” approach to the interplay
between Article I tribunals and Article III courts to other approaches). Under Professor
Pfander’s approach, the Tax Court, currently considered an Article I court, would be
properly characterized as a tribunal. See id. at 760 n.553 (observing the classification of the
Tax Court as an Article I tribunal and noting that it “simply functions as a more formal
version of the executive official who calculated the amount due from [the taxpayer] and
instituted collection proceedings against him”). This terminological distinction would
clarify confusion arising from classification of the Tax Court as an Article I court of record
that nonetheless seems to operate halfway between the legislative and judicial branches of
government. See id. at 775–76 (explaining the benefits of the inferior tribunals method of
delineating between adjudicatory bodies serving under different branches of government).
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some protections to ensure the impartiality of judges.79 Article I courts,
including the Tax Court, do not benefit from these impartiality
protections.80 For example, the Tax Court makes its budget requests
directly to Congress, which are considered by the same committees that
write the Internal Revenue Code.81 The Tax Court is thus tasked to
impartially judge disputes in which the United States is always a party,
but must make its own budget requests directly from the very same
people who write the law being applied.82 This, combined with the fact
that Congress has the power to alter the salaries of Tax Court judges,
places upon the Tax Court a natural temptation to explain its performance
to the tax-writing committees.83 Some have raised doubts about how
It would also eliminate any latent constitutional issue regarding the Tax Court’s status as a
court exercising judicial power of the United States under Article I. See generally id.
(explaining the advantages of Professor Pfander’s inferior tribunals approach to
categorization).
79
See Pfander, supra note 78, at 646 (discussing Article III’s establishment of tenure and
salary protections from Congress). It would not be necessary for another entity to have direct
and substantial control over judicial terms and compensation for it to have a potential effect
on the impartiality of courts. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal judges “shall
hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services,
a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”). Even if
the majority of cases would be unchanged, the threat of losing their positions or other
retribution could influence the judgment of those sitting on the Tax Court in controversial
cases. Id.
80
See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 912 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(questioning how Tax Court judges could exercise independent judicial authority when their
livelihoods are subject to the executive).
81
See Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1210–11 n.108 and accompanying text
(providing the Chief Judge of the Tax Court J. Edgar Murdock’s explanation of the
administrative matters and appropriations requests of the Court); see also International
Conference of Courts with Income Tax Jurisdiction: Conference Discussion Agenda: Responses and
Materials Provided by the Participants in the International Conference of Courts with Income Tax
Jurisdiction, 8 VA. TAX REV. 255, 296 (1988) (“The Court primarily deals in Congress with the
tax writing committees. Appropriations are by subcommittees handling treasury and
general government appropriations—not the judiciary.”).
82
See Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1210–12 (expressing concern over the
necessity of the Tax Court to request its budget from the same people that write the IRC).
83
See Geier, supra note 74, at 1001 n.77 (discussing the separation-of-powers and
impartiality problems of non-Article III tribunals); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 408 (A.
Hamilton) (Liberty Fund Inc. 2001) (emphasis in original) (“Next to permanency in office,
nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges, than a fixed provision for
their support . . . In the general course of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence
amounts to a power over his will.”); Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1210–12 (articulating
concern for the impartiality, actual or perceived, of the Tax Court). For example, when
justifying the Tax Court’s 1990 budget, Chief Judge Arthur Nims said “[d]uring fiscal year
1988, the dollar amount of deficiencies ultimately determined by the Court to be owed by
taxpayers was $1.3 billion, over 46 times the amount of our fiscal year 1990 budget request.”
Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1211–12 (quoting then-Chief Judge Samuel B. Sterrett
who justified the proposed budget by saying “During fiscal year 1986, the amount of
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impartial Tax Court judges can truly be when faced with these conflicting
structural incentives.84
Despite perhaps being too closely connected to Congress to make
impartial decisions, the Tax Court faces somewhat unclear oversight. 85 It
is not legally subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, Administrative
Office of United States Courts, Rules Enabling Act, Judicial Conference, or
Freedom of Information Act.86 Instead, the Court’s primary source of
transparent accountability lies in appellate review. 87 However, the
effectiveness of appellate review of the Tax Court has been questioned
because is necessarily case-specific and limited to what is included in the
record.88 These critics point out how difficult, if not impossible, it is for
appellate courts to review actions outside of the record.89 In all matters
beyond potentially reversing a particular decision, the only meaningful
source of oversight faced by the Tax Court is direct congressional
supervision.90

deficiencies ultimately determined by the Court to be owed by taxpayers was $758,863,980
or about 27 times the amount of our fiscal year 1988 budget request.”). Granted, no such
comments during budget request meetings have been made for years after 1990. Id. at 1212.
Regardless, the structural incentives continue to raise concern. Id.
84
See id. at 1212 (explaining how, even if the Tax Court judges can truly remain neutral
when judging disputes despite the adverse incentives they face, questions about the
objectivity of the Tax Court may undermine the confidence in the tax system which is
particularly detrimental to a system relying on voluntary compliance).
85
See Lederman, Restructuring, supra note 65, at 2–3 (describing the historical and
interpretational difficulties associated with the Tax Court).
86
Id. at 2–3. For example, in 1985, the Comptroller of the United States explained that the
“U.S. Tax Court, a legislative court of record, is not bound by GSA [General Services
Administration] regulation on person convenience items (41 C.F.R. § 101–26.103–2) which
applies only to executive branch agencies, nor by an Administrative Office of the United
States Courts regulation (Title VIII of the ‘Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures’) since
the Tax Court is not part of the judicial branch.” Decision of the Comptroller General, Matter
Of: Purchase of Decorative Items for Individual Offices at the United States Tax Court 1, 5–
6, File B–217869 (Aug. 22, 1985), http://archive.gao.gov/lglpdf16/127736.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TX46-TVHE].
87
See Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1215–16 n.132 and accompanying text
(noting a distinct lack of documents from the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
regarding the Tax Court—a total of six during the nineteen-year period from 1970 to 1989).
88
See id. at 1215–16 (describing appellate review of Tax Court decisions and the nature of
appellate review). As noted above, cases decided by the Tax Court may be appealed to the
respective regional federal circuit courts. See supra note 63 and accompanying text
(describing how appeals from the Tax Court go to regional Circuit Courts and appeals from
the Court of Federal Claims goes to the Federal Circuit Court).
89
Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1216. Such actions would include, for example,
the Court’s rule-making, setting of internal policies, and potentially the decisions of what to
include in the record. Id.
90
Id. Congressional oversight, however, is not well-suited to routine guidance. Id.
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In addition to the critiques for its impartiality and lack of oversight,
the Tax Court has also been criticized for its lack of transparency. 91 In
Ballard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, evidence showed that the judge
who signed the opinion of the Tax Court was not responsible for the
entirety of the opinion and did not make his own final findings of fact. 92
Indeed, there was evidence the final opinion reversed the initial factual
findings instead of deferring to them.93 It was not until the Supreme
Court, noting “it is routine in federal judicial and administrative decisionmaking both to disclose the initial report of a hearing officer, and to make
that report part of the record available to an appellate forum,” held that
the Tax Court could not conceal the initial report and remanded to the
appellate circuits, which ordered the Tax Court to produce the report, over
the objection of the IRS. 94 When the report was ultimately disclosed, the
Eleventh Circuit noted the Tax Court judge did indeed improperly
disregard the initial factual findings.95 The Eleventh Circuit also asserted

91
See id. (describing critiques of the Tax Court and pointing out that courts have both
transparent and opaque procedures). Lederman explains that we generally expect courts to
utilize transparent procedures when issues of deference or the independence of decision
makers is involved (e.g., judicial fact-finding), or when transparency would prevent shirking
of one’s duty (e.g., whether a judge participated in a particular decision). Id. See also Leandra
Lederman, Transparency and Obfuscation in Tax Court Procedure, 102 TAX NOTES 1539, 1544
n.44 (2004) [hereinafter Lederman, Transparency] (describing a situation in which a Tax Court
judge withheld a report written by a special trial judge (“STJ”) from the record which
meaningfully hampered appellate review and arguing that the Tax Court should be required
to disclose STJ reports, at least to reviewing appellate courts).
92
544 U.S. 38, 53–56 (2005). This is troublesome because findings of fact is one area where
the judicial system expects transparency. See supra note 91 and accompanying text
(providing some areas in which we expect transparency from courts). If the judge that signed
the opinion did not find the facts on the record and another factfinder is not identified,
appellate courts have no way of holding the fact finder accountable for potential abuses of
discretion. Lederman, Transparency, supra note 91, at 1540–41.
93
See Louise Story, Secrecy ls Lifted in Some Tax Court Trials, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/12/business/secrecy-is-lifted-in-some-tax-courttrials.html [https://perma.cc/TEK5-RMX8] (July 12, 2005) (telling the story surrounding
Estate of Kanter v. Comm’r, 337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (rev’d), where a Tax Court judge and a
STJ told Kanter’s lawyers the final opinion had improperly reversed the initial findings of
fact).
94
Ballard, 544 U.S. at 46; see also Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1221 (explaining
the procedural developments in Ballard after the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
lower decisions, including Kanter).
95
Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1221–22. The original report concluded, in
contrast to the Tax Court’s official opinion, with respect to the fraud penalty, that:
Respondent has not established that there was an underpayment of tax
by any of the petitioners arising out of what respondent derisively
described throughout the trial of this case as “kickback schemes”
wherein moneys were exacted as a condition for doing business, and
that such moneys constituted income that was no[t] reported by
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the withholding of the report prevented proper review of the evidence on
the record and materially impeded the process of appellate review.96
B. Appointed Counsel
Having looked at how the tax system operates, it is now appropriate
to examine under what circumstances courts will appoint counsel to
litigants.97 Appointment of counsel is generally justified in one of three
ways: under either (1) the Sixth Amendment, (2) the Due Process Clause,
or (3) 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).98 First, Part II.B.1 examines Sixth Amendment
appointments of counsel.99 Next, Part II.B.2 describes appointments made
to comply with due process.100 Part II.B.3 introduces § 1915(d) and discuss
under which circumstances counsel may be appointed under the
statute.101 Finally, Part II.B.4 briefly explains the indigency requirement
necessary for appointment of counsel under the methods above. 102

petitioners . . . There is no[] showing that taxes were evaded or avoided
on any of the payments made by “The Five.”
Id. Quite the contrary, respondent’s witnesses, including its own agents, testified that all of
the payments by “‘The Five’ had been reported on Federal income tax returns, and the taxes
due thereon had been paid . . . . The Court . . . does not consider [certain] transactions [the
IRS cited as indicative of fraud] as even rising to the level of suspicion of fraud.” Id. (quoting
Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion of STJ Couvillion, Ballard v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 01-17249), reprinted in Ballard Special Trial Judge
Opinion Released to Eleventh Circuit, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 6, 2005, available at 2005 TNT 10716 (LEXIS)).
96
See Ballard v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 429 F.3d 1026, 1032 (2005) (determining that
withholding evidence the court relied on from the record prevented proper appellate
review); see also Lederman, Tax Appeal, supra note 73, at 1222 n.167 (explaining that, once the
appellate court received the report excluded from the record, it reached the opposite result
than it had done without access to the report). The Eleventh Circuit went as far as to say “[i]t
is obvious now that the withholding of Special Trial Judge Couvillion’s original report did, in
fact, impede the process of appellate review.” Ballard, 429 F.3d at 1032 (emphasis added).
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized in its remand instructions that Judge David Couvillion’s
factual findings were to be presumed correct unless “manifestly unreasonable”—the proper
standard the Tax Court should have used initially. Id.
97
See infra Part II.B.1 (examining law surrounding appointment of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment); infra Part II.B.2 (discussing appointment of counsel under the Due Process
Clause); infra Part II.B.3 (introducing statutory discretionary appointment of counsel).
98
See infra Part II.B (outlining the ways in which counsel may be appointed for litigants).
99
See infra Part II.B.1 (describing Supreme Court precedent regarding Sixth Amendment
appointment of counsel).
100
See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Supreme Court precedent regarding due process
appointment of counsel).
101
See infra Part II.B.3 (detailing appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)).
102
See infra Part II.B.4 (explaining the indigency requirement all appointments of counsel
are subject to).
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Appointed Counsel under the Sixth Amendment

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution ensures criminal
defendants the right to the assistance of counsel. 103 The Supreme Court
did not construe this to mean that all criminal defendants have a right to
counsel, however.104 Instead, the Court read the amendment to mean that
counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel
themselves, unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.105
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
104
See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (noting the defendants who have the
means to retain counsel have access to counsel). It is only those criminal defendants who are
unable to retain counsel (or not offered an opportunity to) that fall under the protection of
the Sixth Amendment. Id.
105
See id. at 467–68 (analyzing the text of the Sixth Amendment). Justice Clark McReynolds
reasoned:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with
crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional
mandate is an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty. When this right is
properly waived, the assistance of counsel is no longer a necessary
element of the court’s jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence.
If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not
competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and
sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty. A court’s jurisdiction at
the beginning of trial may be lost ‘in the course of proceedings’ due to
failure to complete the court—as the Sixth Amendment requires—by
providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who
has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life
or liberty is at stake.
Id. Interestingly, Judge Richard Posner wrote an order where, by all accounts, the defendant
had competently and intelligently waived his right to counsel, but Judge Posner threatened
to appoint counsel to him regardless. United States v. Hakeem El Bay, 14 CR 447, Order of
February 20, 2015. El Bey was indicted for defrauding the IRS and set out to represent
himself pro se. Id. Hakeem appeared of sound mind but insisted on presenting comically
incredible arguments in his defense. Id. Inter alia, he argued that the Queen of England, via
the Stamp Act, exonerated him from paying income tax. Id. He also argued that he was a
“sovereign citizen” and was thus outside the court’s jurisdiction (the proper forum for the
action was, according to El Bey, the International Court of Trade). Id. After pointing out the
incoherency of El Bey’s arguments, Judge Posner wrote that a defendant who has the
cognitive ability to represent himself in a legal proceeding but refuses to confine his defense
to testimony, argument, and other evidence that are permissible in a legal proceeding—
103
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The right to government-appointed counsel under the Sixth
Amendment is thus very limited.106 First, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees only the right to access to counsel, not necessarily the provision
of counsel.107 If a defendant has access to counsel but competently chooses
not to obtain it, the government has not denied him counsel—he simply
chose not to utilize it.108 In contrast, if a defendant could have retained
counsel for his defense and the government prevented him from doing so,
that would constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment. 109
Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment demands the government give a
criminal defendant more than a chance to call a lawyer.110 If a criminal
defendant lacks the ability hire a lawyer, any chance the government gives
him to hire one would be moot because he lacks the ability. 111 In this case,
to comply with the Sixth Amendment, the government must appoint
counsel to represent him.112
refuses in effect to cooperate with the court and obey the law governing the proceeding—
forfeits his right to defend himself. Id.
106
See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (declining to extend an automatic right
of counsel to defendants at a civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay a child support
order). Turner outlines alternative procedural safeguards the state can use:
(1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in
the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent) to
elicit relevant financial information; (3) an opportunity at the hearing
for the defendant to respond to statements and questions about his
financial status, (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form); and
(4) an express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to
pay.
Id. at 2519.
107
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963) (outlining a test for when due
process requires access to assistance of counsel). There is a technical argument to be made
that an indigent defendant may have access to counsel if he can find an attorney willing to
represent him pro bono. While this may meet a stricter interpretation of “access to,” courts
have not followed this, possibly arising from a reluctance to require a criminal defendant to
place himself at the mercy of an independent attorney. See id. (discussing “access to” Sixth
Amendment guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel). To this end, court-appointed
counsel is made available to indigent defendants. Defendants are still able to retain counsel
pro bono if they can find it, but courts have not interpreted access to adequate counsel so
strictly as to force a defendant to lay his fate before, potentially, the only attorney willing to
represent him pro bono.
108
See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 467–68 (analyzing the requirements of the Sixth Amendment).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See id. at 459–63 (describing the poor excuse for due process that can result from a lay
defendant with neither court-appointed counsel nor the means to hire an attorney). The
defendant testified:
I objected to the witness’ testimony. I didn’t ask him any questions, I
only objected to his whole testimony. After the prosecuting attorney
was finished with the witness, he said, “Your witness,” and I got up and
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In 1963, the Court famously incorporated the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel against the states.113 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court
reasoned that an indigent defendant has access to counsel only if the
government provides it, and would otherwise be swept away in legal
proceedings he does not properly understand, but on which his very
liberty relies.114 The government running a defendant through a gauntlet
of criminal proceedings, despite his inability to obtain counsel on his own,
thus qualifies as a violation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee “to have
the assistance of counsel.”115
Because the Sixth Amendment explicitly limits itself to criminal
matters, one might expect the right to appointed counsel to stop there. 116
objected to the testimony on the grounds that it was all false, and the
Trial Judge said any objection I had I would have to bring proof or
disproof.
Id.
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (accepting “Brady’s
assumption . . . that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a
fair trial’ is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,” but rejecting
its conclusion that the Sixth Amendment is not one of those fundamental rights).
114
Id. See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (describing the perils faced by
pro se defendants). The Court stated:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id.
115
See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (holding that due process requires criminal defendants to
be provided with paid counsel if they cannot do so themselves).
116
See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463 (“[T]his court has pointed to the humane policy of the
modern criminal law which now provides that a defendant, if he be poor, may have counsel
furnished him by the state.”); see also Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (failing to extend the right of
paid counsel to those who can pay for an attorney themselves). Criminal proceedings are
not necessarily required for a court to appoint counsel, but courts have only appointed
counsel where some kind of incarceration is at stake. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2510
(2011) (“Cases directly concerning a right to counsel in civil cases have found a presumption
of such a right ‘only’ in cases involving incarceration, but have not held that a right to counsel
exists in all such cases”). This subsection will primarily address the first requirement: the
criminal limitation of appointment of counsel. The indigency requirement will be addressed
in the next subsection. See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing the indigency requirement for the
appointment of counsel).
113
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However, the Court has found a right to counsel in some limited civil
proceedings.117 This extension of the right is not animated by the Sixth
Amendment, however, for the simple reason that its language cannot be
read to apply to civil cases.118 Instead, a limited right to appointed counsel
has been recognized in a small number of civil proceedings when required
by “the specific dictates of due process.”119
2.

Appointed Counsel under the Due Process Clause

The Sixth Amendment may specifically guarantee the appointment of
counsel, but courts also use the Due Process Clause to guarantee the
appointment of counsel in certain situations. 120 Interestingly enough, one
of the better examples of due process in the context of appointed counsel
comes from before Gideon’s incorporation of the Sixth Amendment. 121 In
1932, the Court heard Powell v. Alabama, where two young black men were
charged with rape, indicted, tried, and sentenced to death—all without a
meaningful opportunity to speak with a lawyer—or even their own
families.122 As the Court had not yet incorporated the Sixth Amendment,
Powell could not rely on it to overturn the conviction.123 Instead, the Court
asserted the right to counsel was so important that its denial could, under
certain circumstances, amount to a violation of the Due Process Clause.124
117
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (acknowledging the extension of appointed counsel to
indigent defendants in some civil contempt proceedings).
118
See id. (noting that the Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions . . . .”) (emphasis added).
119
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (explaining, because a contempt proceeding to compel
support payments is civil in nature, the court must examine the “distinct factors” laid out in
Mathews to determine if due process required appointment of counsel); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (applying “distinct factor” due process analysis).
120
See, e.g., Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (demanding the appointment of counsel under due
process analysis).
121
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49–50 (1932) (overturning convictions because the
state’s failure to appoint counsel constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause).
122
Id.
123
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of access to counsel against the states through the Due Process
Clause).
124
See Powell, 287 U.S. at 70 (recognizing that state decisions regard the right to the aid of
counsel as “fundamental in character”). Powell declared that:
[E]ven if opportunity had been given[] to employ counsel . . . we are of
the opinion that, [under the circumstances of this case], the necessity of
counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due
process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 71. Granted, the facts in Powell were severe. See id. (observing that the defendants were
young and illiterate, the public was hostile to them, they were closely surveyed my military
forces, their friends and families were all in other states and difficult to communicate with,
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It asserted the facts in Powell were sufficient to meet that standard, but
kept its holding notably narrow.125
More general applications of the Due Process Clause utilize a general
test.126 In determining which specific safeguards the Due Process Clause
requires of civil proceedings to ensure they are “fundamentally fair,” the
Supreme Court examines “distinct factors,” including: (1) the nature of
the private interest to be affected, (2) the comparative risk of an erroneous
deprivation of the private interest with and without additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the nature and magnitude of any
countervailing interest in not providing additional or substitute
procedural requirements.127 At first glance, these factors may not seem
overly strict, but the Court’s application of this due process test reveals
just how limited it is.128 While a full exploration of the bounds of this due
process test would fall outside the scope of this Note, it is worth
mentioning the Court has interpreted it narrowly enough to allow the
and that their lives were at peril). It is possible the Court only focused so much on the
severity of the case to find a due process violation because the Sixth Amendment was not
then applicable to the states. See id. (requiring federal and state courts to appoint counsel for
indigent criminal defendants under the Due Process Clauses). The Court considered the
appointment of counsel as an indisputable protection against government overbearance. Id.
125
See id. at 71–72 (holding narrowly that due process required appointment of counsel in
a capital case). The Court’s specific hedging went thus:
Whether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other
circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to
decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is
unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his
own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the
like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign
counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law; and that
duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or under such
circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the
preparation and trial of the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore
the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, “that there are certain
immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard.
Powell, 287 U.S. at 71–72 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898)). The Court
maintained its reluctance to require the appointment of counsel up through Gideon with
assertions such as: “in the great majority of the states, it has been the considered judgment
of the people, their representatives and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a
fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.” Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942).
126
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) laying out three factors to due process
analysis).
127
Id. See also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27–31 (1981) (applying the
Mathews framework).
128
See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2011) (pointing out that the Court had found
a right to counsel only in cases involving incarceration, but not even all cases involving
incarceration); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (declining to extend the right of paid counsel to those
facing termination of their social security disability benefits).
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deprivation of counsel, even in some circumstances where the defendant
may be incarcerated for up to a year.129 The most succinct statement of the
test is thus: the Court has found a right to counsel only in cases involving
incarceration, but not in all cases involving incarceration.130
3.

Appointed Counsel under § 1915(d)

In addition to the Constitution authorizing courts to appoint counsel
under certain circumstances, federal statute also provides a basis for them
to do so.131 Section 1915(d) of the United States Code enables trial courts
to appoint counsel to any party, and places such an appointment at the
discretion of the trial judge.132 While the statute places almost no
restriction on this authority, the appellate courts have provided some
standards to help determine when it is appropriate for a judge to invoke
§ 1915(d).133 At this point, it is sufficient to say the circuit courts do not
agree on one standard.134 Instead, two primary tests have emerged: this
Note will refer to them as the Farmer test and the Maclin test.135
129
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510, 2517 (emphasizing the limited scope of appointed counsel
under the Due Process Clause).
130
See id. (surveying prior case precedent to observe a general pattern of application of
due process appointment of counsel). The Court stated in Turner, for example, that the Due
Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt
proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, even if that
individual faces incarceration for up to a year. Id. The Court went on to clarify:
In particular, [the Due Process Clause] does not require the provision of
counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian (to whom
support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the State
provides alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to those we have
mentioned (adequate notice of the importance of ability to pay, fair
opportunity to present, and to dispute, relevant information, and court
findings.) We do not address civil contempt proceedings where the
underlying child support payment is owed to the State.
Id. at 2520. Note that the Court seemed to think it mattered whether the defendant was
opposing another private party or the state when considering the appropriateness of
appointing counsel. Id. In Tax Court, taxpayers are always opposing government lawyers.
131
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1996) (authorizing courts to “request an attorney to represent
any person unable to afford counsel”).
132
Id.
133
See Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 321–22 (7th Cir. 1993) (comparing tests for applying
§ 1915(d) used by different appellate courts).
134
See id. (discussing multiple standards used by different circuits).
135
See id. (abandoning the multi-factor test laid out in Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887
(7th Cir. 1981), and providing an alternative inquiry). The old Maclin test consisted of several
factors: (1) whether the plaintiff’s claim had some merit; (2) the plaintiff’s ability to
investigate the facts without the assistance of counsel; (3) the complexity of the evidence; (4)
the plaintiff’s ability to represent himself; and (5) the difficulty of the legal issues. Id. The
Seventh Circuit noted a number of problems with the Maclin test: (1) if the first factor is not
met, the case should be dismissed out of hand with no need to worry about counsel; (2) the
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Indigency Requirement for All Methods of Appointing Counsel

Even assuming a case otherwise meets the requirements for
appointing counsel to a litigant, the appointee can be appointed counsel
only if he is unable to hire his own attorney. 136 Unfortunately, the Court
has not provided substantial guidance for determining when a defendant
qualifies.137 After quoting Justice George Sutherland on the right to
counsel, the Gideon court simply stated that “in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him.”138 While written in lofty language, “too poor to hire a lawyer” is
hardly a clear standard.139 Some of the best guidance provided by the
Court on determining indigency came fifteen years before Gideon.140 In
Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., the Court interpreted a statute which
allowed a litigant in federal civil or criminal court to prosecute or defend
second and third factors blend together into one factor involving the plaintiff’s ability to
present evidence; and (3) the fourth factor is dependent on the second, third, and fifth factors.
Id. While some courts (like the Tenth Circuit) still follow the Maclin test, the Seventh Circuit
adopted a simpler one in Farmer. Id. The Farmer test asks three questions: (1) has the indigent
plaintiff made reasonable efforts to retain counsel or been effectively precluded from making
such efforts before reaching appointment; (2) given the difficulty of the case, did the plaintiff
appear to be competent to try it himself; and (3) if not, would the presence of counsel have
made a difference in the outcome. Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). See also
United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793–94 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting that “the appointment
of counsel in a civil case is, as is the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis, a matter within
the discretion of the district court. It is a privilege and not a right . . . . In civil actions for
damages, appointment of counsel should only be allowed in exceptional cases”).
136
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (declining to extend right of
appointed counsel to those who can afford it themselves); but see United States v. Hakeem El
Bay, 14 CR 447, Order of February 20, 2015 (intimating a judicial willingness to appoint
counsel despite the defendant being able (although unwilling) to hire counsel to defend him).
137
See William L. Dick Jr., The Right to Appointed Counsel for Indigent Civil Litigants: The
Demands of Due Process, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 627–29 (1989) (discussing the indigency
requirement of paid counsel); John P. Gross, Too Poor to Hire a Lawyer but Not Indigent: How
States Use the Federal Poverty Guidelines to Deprive Defendants of their Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1173, 1174–77 (2013) (describing how some defendants may
be unable to hire counsel and still not be considered indigent for the purposes of being
provided paid counsel); Elizabeth Neeley & Alan Tomkins, Evaluating Court Processes for
Determining Indigency, 43 CT. REV. 4, 4–8 (2007) (evaluating court processes for determining
indigency).
138
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. While apparently an “obvious truth” to Justice Hugo Black, this
simple statement does not provide any insight into how poor qualifies as “too poor” to hire
an attorney. Id.
139
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (describing the divergent and inconsistent
methods that have arisen to determine what “too poor to hire a lawyer” really means).
140
See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 335 U.S. 331, 336 (1948) (finding error in a
lower court’s denial of Adkin’s motion for appeal on the grounds that her lawyers had not
made satisfactory affidavits of poverty).
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actions without prepaying fees or costs if he submitted an affidavit
attesting “that because of his poverty he is unable to pay the costs.”141 The
Adkins Court determined that a litigant need not be absolutely destitute to
be considered indigent and declined to read the statute in a way that
would require litigants to expend all their resources before invoking the
statute.142 Adkins also noted that it is not only contrary to public policy,
but even illogical to interpret the requirement of being unable to pay court
costs because of his poverty as requiring a litigant to make himself
completely destitute or abandon a meritorious claim.143 Thus, it was not
“complete destitution” that should determine indigency, but rather
whether the litigant can pay the costs “and still be able to provide himself
and dependents with the necessities of life.”144 The Supreme Court has
thus provided a vague, yet very fact-specific inquiry for determining
indigency which gives some guidance but has nonetheless allowed

141
Id. The statute, allowing for appeals in forma pauperis, stated: “Upon leave to proceed
in forma pauperis, the district court may by order specify some different and more economical
manner by which the record on appeal may be prepared and settled, to the end that the
appellant may be enabled to present his case to the appellate court.” Id. at 337.
142
See id. at 339–40 (“To say that no persons are entitled to the statute’s benefits until they
have sworn to contribute to payment of costs, the last dollar they have or can get, and thus
make themselves and their dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe the statute in
a way that would throw its beneficiaries into the category of public charges. The public
would not be profited if relieved of paying costs of a particular litigation only to have
imposed on it the expense of supporting the person thereby made an object of public support.
Nor does the result seem more desirable if the effect of this statutory interpretation is to force
a litigant to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in order to spare himself complete
destitution.”).
143
Id.
144
Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339–40 (internal quotation marks omitted). A year after Gideon was
decided, Justice Arthur Goldberg attempted to further clarify the meaning of “indigence” in
a footnote to his concurring opinion in Hardy v. United States, which, in pertinent part, read:
“Indigence must be conceived as a relative concept. An impoverished accused is not
necessarily one totally devoid of means. An accused must be deemed indigent when ‘at any
stage of the proceedings [his] lack of means . . . substantially inhibits or prevents the proper
assertion of a [particular] right or a claim of right.’” Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 227, 289
n.7 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON POVERTY
& THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. JUST., REP. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMIN. OF FED. CRIM. JUST. 8 (1963)).
Indigence must be defined with reference to the particular right asserted. Id.
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countless differing standards to arise. 145 The specific determination of
indigency is not the focus of this Note, however.146
Thus, Part II has provided a background of tax law and of the methods
used to appoint counsel to indigent litigants. 147 Part III applies the
methods of appointing counsel to indigent taxpayers in Tax Court. 148
Ultimately, Part III does not contribute a new statute or rule to the Tax
Court, but rather seeks to contribute an interpretation: an interpretation
of the Due Process Clause or of § 1915(d) as applies to indigent taxpayers
in civil litigation.149
III. ANALYSIS
This Note will now apply the previously-discussed standards to the
Tax Court and ultimately conclude indigent taxpayers meet at least one of
those standards and should thus be appointed counsel by the Tax Court. 150
Part III.A first applies the existing due process analysis to indigent
taxpayers in Tax Court.151 Part III.B then examines the propriety of
discretionary § 1915(d) appointment of counsel as an alternative to
appointment of counsel under the Due Process Clause.152
See Gross, supra note 137, at 1193–94 (describing varying methods of determining
indigency). State courts have taken various approaches in determining indigency, though
many of them incorporate the usage of Federal Poverty Guidelines as well as the discretion
of the trial court. Id. Gross highlights some problems with how the states have taken to
determining indigency, including the peculiar result of some criminal defendants qualifying
for food stamps but not assigned counsel. Id. See also Neeley & Tomkins, supra note 137, at
4–8 (mentioning the different methods used to determine indigency, many based on yearly
income at different percentages of the federal poverty line).
146
See infra Part III (arguing the Tax Court should appoint counsel to indigent taxpayers,
however indigency is fairly-determined).
147
See supra Part II (providing a background of tax law and law governing appointment of
counsel to defendants).
148
See infra Part III (applying methods of appointing counsel to indigents before the Tax
Court and arguing such indigents should be appointed counsel).
149
Infra Part III.
150
See infra Part III.A–B (arguing for applicability of existing methods of appointing
counsel to the Tax Court). Some older decisions seem to focus on whether the defendant
requested counsel or not. See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding “in a
capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately
of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it
is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law”). This Note will not draw a distinction between those
circumstances, although the Tax Court limiting appointment of counsel only to indigent
taxpayers who request it would not seem unreasonable.
151
See infra Part III.A (addressing discretionary appointment of counsel under federal
statute and discussing why extending counsel to taxpayers not in fear of incarceration is,
while unprecedented, justified).
152
See infra Part III.B (applying § 1915(d) tests to taxpayers in Tax Court).
145
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A. Appointment of Counsel under Due Process Standards
To properly address the question of due process in a civil proceeding,
it is necessary to show both that the proceeding meets the general
requirements of due process analysis and that the extension is not flying
too far afield of the Supreme Court’s repeated assertion that due process
affords civil litigants the right to counsel only in very limited
circumstances.153 Part III.A.1 applies standard due process analysis to
taxpayers before the Tax Court. 154 Part III.A.2 then follows by assuring
readers the Due Process Clause can remain limited while allowing this one
extension.155
1.

Application of Due Process Standards to Indigent Taxpayers before
the Tax Court

As discussed above, the Supreme Court has recognized that an
indigent defendant may require the state to provide him with counsel he
could not otherwise provide for himself. 156 This requirement is almost
exclusively limited to criminal proceedings, but even that seemingly clear
distinction blurs in some tax circumstances. 157 Returning to the example
of tax fraud, auditing taxpayers for suspected fraud involves a concurrent
inquiry into both offenses, which share identical constituent elements.158
Nonetheless, there is a recognized difference between civil and criminal
tax offenses, and there has been some case law attempting to clarify the

153
See infra Part III.A.1–2 (demonstrating due process analysis to taxpayers and explaining
why the unprecedented extension is appropriate in practice).
154
See infra Part III.A.1 (applying Supreme Court due process precedent to indigent
taxpayers before the Tax Court).
155
See infra Part III.A.2 (acknowledging hesitations to extend the Due Process Clause to
more civil proceedings).
156
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that the Due Process Clause
requires an indigent criminal defendant to be provided counsel).
157
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1178 (comparing the sections of the IRC which govern civil and
criminal tax fraud). Ise explains:
The identity between the two sections has further significance because
the imposition of one sanction by the government does not bar the
imposition of the other. Conceivably, each penalty might be imposed in
every case of tax evasion. This latter possibility gives a tax fraud
investigation a dual nature and generates issues concerning the point at
which the Miranda warnings should attach, and whether or not
discovery obtained by means of an administration subpoena issued by
the IRS may be used in criminal prosecution.
Id.
158
See id. (discussing the implications of civil and criminal offenses constituted of identical
elements).
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line between the two.159 When trying to determine when Miranda
warnings should be given to a potential defendant in a criminal tax
prosecution, the Supreme Court attempted to delineate when an IRS
investigation actually transforms from civil assessment to criminal
investigation.160 Prior to 1966, the Court asserted a defendant is protected
by the Sixth Amendment guarantee of access to counsel beginning at the
moment the IRS shifts its focus from investigatory to accusatory. 161 PostMiranda, however, most courts focus primarily on whether the taxpayer
was in government custody at the time in question. 162
This custody requirement would seem simple: the taxpayer is entitled
to counsel at the moment he is arrested for a tax crime. 163 This is
complicated, however, by Mathis v. United States, where the Supreme
Court held Miranda warnings were required when the defendant was
questioned by IRS agents while in custody for a charge unrelated to the
tax investigation.164 Statements made by the taxpayer were thus deemed
inadmissible because the interview took place in a jail, even though at the

159
See id. (surveying the Supreme Court’s attempts at drawing a line between civil and
criminal tax fraud).
160
See generally id. at 1182–92 (dedicating significant explanation and analysis to Miranda
warnings in tax investigations). Miranda warnings are: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) that
any statement made may be used against the person undergoing interrogation; (3) the right
to consult and have present an attorney; and (4) the right to have an appointed attorney in
the event of indigency. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966).
161
See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). While the investigatory versus
accusatory distinction gives scarcely more guidance than a civil versus criminal distinction,
the Court would later refine its line-drawing in the Miranda decision by focusing on
governmental custody of the defendant. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444–45 (including a
consideration of police custody into the determination of whether a defendant was entitled
to appointed counsel). The information at issue in Escobedo was obtained while the
defendant was in police custody and being questioned in an interrogation room. See 378 U.S.
at 481–84 (reversing defendant’s conviction based on analysis which considered police
maintaining custody over him). Without having been read his Miranda rights, the
information Escobedo disclosed at that time was deemed inadmissible by the Court. Id.
162
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1185–86 (discussing cases using both the custody test and the
accusatory test to determine when Miranda warnings should attach).
163
Id.
164
391 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1968). The Court further recognized that:
A “routine tax investigation” may be initiated for the purpose of a civil
action rather than criminal prosecution. To this extent tax investigations
differ from investigations of murder, robbery, and other crimes. But tax
investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions, just as the one
here did. In fact, the last visit of the revenue agent to the jail to question
petitioner took place only eight days before the full-fledged criminal
investigation concededly began. And as the investigating revenue agent
was compelled to admit, there was always the possibility during his
investigation that his work would end up in a criminal prosecution.
Id.
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time the IRS investigation was purely civil.165 This decision appears to
frame the custody element of delineating civil from criminal tax
investigations as a convenient place to draw a line rather than a true
indicator of where constitutional due process requirements may actually
lie.166 This standard is understandable, given it is often impossible to
know whether the IRS will ultimately pursue criminal prosecution until it
has already collected evidence of criminal culpability as part of the civil
investigation.167
Yet with such a nebulous investigatory system—and a standard for
delineating the threshold for criminal procedural protections that bears
little resemblance to what the IRS may actually be investigating—it is
difficult to say a taxpayer at risk of criminal prosecution enjoys the same
protections as those afforded to citizens suspected of non-tax crimes.168
For example, it cannot be said with certainty that a civil defendant may
not be subject to future criminal prosecution for tax fraud unless (1) he has
already faced prosecution for the act, thereby under the protection of the
Double Jeopardy Clause; or (2) the statute of limitations has passed. 169
This is particularly troubling given the general ability of the IRS to initiate
civil assessment, gather information, make findings, and then convert the
assessment into a criminal investigation. 170 It is uncontroverted that an

165
See id. (holding evidence produced in an interview conducted for a civil investigation
inadmissible because it was conducted while the defendant was in police custody for an
unrelated criminal matter).
166
Cf. Ise, supra note 11, at 1187–88 (explaining the difficulty in applying a strict custody
test, partly because some cases seem to conflict with others). United States v. Dickerson, for
example, focused on the statement in Mathis that “routine tax investigations frequently lead
to criminal prosecutions” when deemphasizing the factor of custody. Id. at 1187 (citing 413
F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969)). Likewise, the Supreme Court appeared to deviate from the
custody requirement in Orozco v. Texas, where it required Miranda warnings where no formal
custody existed because there was an appearance that the defendant was deprived of his
freedom in a significant way. Id. at 1188 (citing 394 U.S. 324 (1969)).
167
See Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4 (noting routine tax investigation frequently leads to criminal
prosecutions).
168
See supra Part II.A (describing the process surrounding tax investigation).
169
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person “shall . . . be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”). Depending on the tax violation, the
statute of limitations for criminal tax fraud or evasion is generally three to six years. I.R.C.
§ 6531(2). These can be significantly lengthened, however. See, e.g., United States v. Irby,
703 F.3d 280, 283–84 (2012) (holding that the statute of limitations for tax evasion began to
run on the date of defendant’s last act of evasion occurred, rather than the date his return
was filed). Some courts, for example, have held the six year statute on criminal tax evasion
begins to run only upon the last act of evasion. Id. Civil tax fraud does not have a statute of
limitation. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1) (2014) (providing that “[i]n the case of a false or fraudulent
return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for
collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time”).
170
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1185–86 (giving examples of IRS enforcement procedures).
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indigent criminal defendant is entitled to paid counsel, but by the time an
indigent defendant ultimately faces criminal prosecution, he may have
already affected his criminal case while he was left without access to
counsel.171 Conversely, because prosecution of criminal fraud is usually
followed by imposition of a civil fraud penalty, an indigent tax defendant
who was appointed counsel for his criminal proceeding would have his
attorney taken away from him for the civil proceeding which would
undoubtedly involve the findings of the former. 172 The defendant would
thus be left with the remains of a complicated tax matter to re-litigate the
same issues his attorney just argued, but in a civil context.173
Assuming the IRS’s plenary discretion discussed above is sufficient to
raise due process concerns regarding indigent taxpayers before the Tax
Court, the next step in the analysis would involve applying the Supreme
Court’s “distinct factors” to determining which specific safeguards are
required by the Due Process Clause.174 This application should occur
while keeping in mind the stated goal of such due process protections: to
make the proceedings between the government and the citizen
“fundamentally fair.”175 Without the requirement of fundamental fairness
between government and citizen, the risk of abusive use of power and

See id. at 1181–82 (discussing the application of collateral estoppel to tax fraud).
Id.
173
See Lipton, supra note 48, at 532 (discussing the IRS’s priority of sanctions). The
converse, or a defendant being appointed counsel after already handling his own civil
assessment pro se, is unlikely given the IRS’s policy to give overriding importance to the
criminal aspects of tax fraud investigation. Id. The doctrine of collateral estoppel, however,
makes the potential interplay between criminal and civil tax proceedings more troubling.
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1181–85 (describing the application of collateral estoppel within the
context of taxpayer Miranda warnings). When a taxpayer is convicted of criminal tax fraud,
for example, he is necessarily liable for civil tax fraud. Id. at 1181. On the other hand, due to
the different standards of proof, a prior acquittal of tax fraud does not necessarily mean he
is exempt from civil liability. Id. See also Lipton, supra note 48, at 534 n.3 (discussing collateral
estoppel in civil and criminal tax proceedings). The only situation in which a taxpayer could
potentially benefit from collateral estoppel is if he prevailed on the issue of fraud in a civil
case and then invoked the doctrine in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Id. This situation
is unlikely, however, given the IRS policy to give “overriding importance” to the criminal
aspects of a tax fraud investigation and hold all civil aspects in abeyance. Id.
174
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–40 (1976) (providing three factors to aid in
due process application). The “distinct factors,” as relevant to a civil proceeding, were listed
by the Supreme Court as: (1) the nature of the “private interest that will be affected;” (2) the
comparative “risk” of an “erroneous deprivation” of that interest with and without
“additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) the nature and magnitude of any
countervailing interest in not providing “additional or substitute procedural
requirement[s].” Id.
175
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (concluding the right to access to
counsel is “fundamental . . . [and] essential to a fair trial” and is applicable to the states).
171
172
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unjustified takings falls too far in favor of the government. 176 This goal
was the underlying and fundamental concern of the Court when requiring
the appointment of counsel in Gideon, Lassiter, and Powell.177 This concern
becomes no less important if the government is seeking to seize money the
taxpayer may not have and may not be owed. 178
The first factor considered by the Court in determining the specific
requirements of due process is the nature of the private interest to be
affected.179 The Court has never considered the mere loss of money as an
interest comparable to one’s physical liberty.180 Specifically, the Court has
only provided paid counsel in circumstances where incarceration is at
issue.181 Namely, criminal proceedings or some civil proceedings
involving incarceration such as civil contempt. 182 However, Justice Byron
White’s discussion of blending unrelated custody requirements in his
Mathis dissent would seem to indicate that the incarceration requirement
is not as clear as one would think. 183 If Miranda warnings are required
during a civil assessment because custody asserts a certain form of
government coercion to answer questions, then the right to access to
counsel is not guaranteed inherently by government custody of the
taxpayer, but rather by the presence of unfair government coercion.184 Thus,
when examined through the lens of Mathis, the identical tax fraud
176
Cf. id. at 344 (“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him . . . Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime.”).
177
See id. (highlighting the inequity between indigent litigants pitted against the
government). Governments likewise spend vast sums of money to ensure taxes are properly
assessed and collected. See Lipton, supra note 48, at 532–35 (describing IRS enforcement
methods). While criminal interaction between government and defendant risks liberty,
interaction between government and a taxpayer retains this overbearing power of the state.
Id.
178
Cf. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (speaking directly to appointing counsel in criminal cases, but
implying an overarching concern of government overreach).
179
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35 (applying “distinct factor” due process analysis); Turner
v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517 (2011) (explaining and applying the “distinct factors” laid out
in Mathews to determine if due process required the appointment of counsel).
180
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510–17 (continuing to limit appointed counsel to cases
involving incarceration, generally criminal).
181
See id. (expressing that the Court previously had found a right to counsel “‘only’ in cases
involving incarceration, but have not held that a right to counsel exists in all such cases”).
182
Id.
183
See Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 7 (1968) (White, J., dissenting) (“But Miranda
rested not on the mere fact of physical restriction but on a conclusion that coercion—pressure
to answer questions—usually flows from a certain type of custody, police station
interrogation of someone charged with or suspected of a crime.”).
184
See id. (implying counsel is appointed in some civil cases not necessarily because they
involve incarceration, but because they involve otherwise-unchecked government power
bearing down on an individual).
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elements and the significant discretion and power of the IRS, the private
interest to be affected may only be money, but the nature of the interest
and the proceedings surrounding its deprivation are far more severe. 185
The second factor is the comparative “risk” of an “erroneous
deprivation” of the interest with and without the “additional or substitute
procedural safeguards.”186 To the indigent taxpayer, the risk of
deprivation of his right to counsel is significant.187 As a pro se litigant
before the Tax Court, the taxpayer would face a significant disadvantage
in advocating his interests. 188 Furthermore, as an indigent, his interest in
whatever money he does have would be comparatively greater than
courts might ordinarily assume.189 Of particular importance and
relevance to indigents, tax deficiencies are one of the few forms of debt not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.190 As someone incapable of affording his
own counsel, set against the might of specialized IRS litigators, and facing
the possibility of losing what money he has left, depriving an indigent
taxpayer of adequate counsel risks subjecting him to substantial
hardship.191
The third factor is the nature and magnitude of any countervailing
government interests in not providing “additional or substitute
procedural requirement[s].”192 The sum of countervailing government
interests and costs are not entirely clear in this situation; the government
would certainly face the financial burden of paying for the counsel
provided but it also has an interest in proper adjudication of tax disputes,
which actually militates in favor of providing counsel to indigent

Cf. id. (intimating a broader application of due process appointment of counsel).
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (continuing to lay out factors for consideration to
determine the specific requirements of due process).
187
See Marcus Schoenfeld, The Tax Concepts of “Defendant” and “Support”: Their Impact on
“Tax Indigents,” 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 855, 855–56 (1999) (pointing out low-income taxpayers
may suffer more than wealthy taxpayers in some ways because low-income taxpayers are
less likely to have their returns completed by a professional, resulting in a greater probability
of error).
188
See Lederman & Hrung, supra note 10, at 1281–82 (demonstrating an observable
advantage in litigation afforded by professional counsel).
189
Id.
190
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2012) (designating debt for a tax or customs duty nondischargeable).
191
See Daniel Friedman & József Sákovics, The Marginal Utility of Money: A Modern
Mashallian Approach to Consumer Choice 1–3 (July 19, 2011), http://economics.ucsc.edu/
research/downloads/Friedman-Sakovics-MU23.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CU3X-S7PU]
(introducing the concept of marginal utility of money).
192
See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2011) (describing the factors for finding the
specific dictates of due process).
185
186
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taxpayers.193 Because paid counsel has never been an issue in civil tax
disputes, it is hard to say how many taxpayers would qualify as indigent,
but some have questioned whether a large number of taxpayers could
qualify.194 One would generally think that if the IRS is spending time to
pursue a civil investigation, the defendant has at least some assets upon
which he can draw to hire counsel if he desires. 195 On the other hand, the
IRS already provides funding to Low Income Tax Clinics (“LITC”) that
provide free or low-cost representation to taxpayers meeting certain
indigency requirements. 196 Recognizing that (1) LITCs demonstrate some
level of indigency among taxpayers before the Tax Court; (2) it is entirely
possible for an indigent criminal tax defendant to be appointed counsel
for his criminal defense only to be subsequently required to litigate nearly
the very same issues in a civil investigation on his own; and (3) civil and
criminal tax investigation are highly fluid; whatever countervailing
government interests exist against appointing counsel to indigent
taxpayers is not strong enough to prevail. 197
193
See Low Income Taxpayer Clinics, supra note 13 (describing the IRS’s LITC program,
which already provides federal funds to legal clinics that offer representation to low income
taxpayers at no or low cost). Court-appointed counsel would likely divert some taxpayers
from the clinics the IRS already provides funding to. Id. Such a change would not therefore
create such a heavy financial burden for the government to bear as might otherwise be
thought; the IRS has already shouldered some of the financial burden, possibly as an
acknowledgment that indigent taxpayers require some form of legal assistance. Id. See also
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963) (mentioning judicial refusal to interpret
the Sixteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “access to counsel” to criminal defendants satisfied
by the availability of soliciting an attorney to represent them pro bono). An indigent’s access
to counsel in civil tax proceedings should be interpreted similarly.
194
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1190 n.110 (wondering whether issuing the fourth Miranda
warning (that an indigent accused is entitled to have counsel appointed for him) is necessary
in criminal tax investigations and asking “[h]ow many taxpayers suspected of tax evasion
are indigent?”).
195
See id. (questioning the prevalence of indigent taxpayers charged with tax evasion); see
also Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1088 (2016) (holding that pretrial restraint of
legitimate assets not traceable to a criminal offence and needed for a criminal defendant to
retain his counsel of choice violates the Sixth Amendment). Granted, Luis dealt with a
criminal defendant, not a litigant in Tax Court. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1088. If a taxpayer has
enough money to hire counsel for Tax Court, however, but not enough to hire counsel and
pay the potential deficiency, he may be forced to choose between effective counsel and
fulfilling a legitimate obligation to the IRS.
196
See Low Income Taxpayer Clinics, supra note 13 (noting the IRS’s LITC program, where it
helps fund clinics that represent taxpayers before the Tax Court).
197
See supra Part II.A (describing how the elements for civil and criminal tax fraud are
identical and how the only potential difference is an “evil motive” difference of degree).
Especially because a criminal fraud conviction necessarily imposes a civil fraud liability, it
would be reasonable to at least say that those criminal defendants who qualified as indigent
under traditional criminal procedures would maintain their status when tried in civil court.
Supra Part II.A. As a reminder, this Note is not suggesting a full extension of Gideon’s
requirement of access to counsel to all civil litigation where the government is a party. Nor
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Some have asked how many taxpayers suspected of tax evasion
would, in reality, qualify as indigent.198 This doubt is understandably
founded on the presumption that tax defendants are involved in tax
deficiency procedures because they had money that they declined to pay
taxes on, yielding them even more money. 199 Theoretically, all of this
money would be available to pay for a tax lawyer in the event that the IRS
took the defendant to court.200 While this is certainly an easy picture to
paint of those charged with tax fraud, it is not the only portrait seen in the
Tax Court.201
Within the context of appointed counsel, indigency simply requires
that the defendant be unable to obtain adequate legal counsel by his own
means.202 This does not necessarily mean that one must be in abject
poverty to qualify as indigent for the purposes of state-appointed
counsel.203 A taxpayer may potentially be considered a part of the middle
class, but if he is unable to hire adequate counsel on his own, he would
presumably fit the definition of “indigent.” 204 Indeed, depending on the

is it suggesting that court-appointed counsel must be available in all civil tax litigation.
Instead, this Note argues that the ambiguities of tax enforcement should be recognized, that
the indigency requirement of court-appointed counsel be maintained, and that, where there
is uncertainty with respect to the line between civil and criminal investigation and issues of
fairness between the government and unsophisticated taxpayers, courts should lean toward
protecting fundamental constitutional rights of the citizen by ensuring that tax defendants
on the margin have access to a fair hearing.
198
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1190 n.110 (questioning the existence of indigent taxpayers
suspected of tax evasion).
199
See id. (noting the apparent incongruity between crimes directly resulting in a
defendant owning more money and indigency). This Note does not discuss how a taxpayer
would necessarily become subject to tax deficiencies while lacking the funds to pay them. It
is instead content to leave the factual determination of indigency for a more detailed analysis
and rest on the assumption that indigent taxpayers may, in fact exist. See supra note 138
(getting into more detail about how different states determine indigency).
200
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1190 n.110 (wondering how many charged with tax evasion
would truly be indigent).
201
See Low Income Tax Clinics, supra note 13 (referencing the IRS’s LITC program). Given
that some taxpayers in Tax Court already qualify as “low income,” it would seem improbable
for no taxpayers before the Tax Court to qualify as indigent. Id.
202
See Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 335 U.S. 331, 336 (1948) (refusing to require
litigants to place themselves in abject poverty to enjoy the benefit of a statute allowing for
appeals in forma pauperis); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963)
(“[C]ounsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel . . . .”).
203
See Schoenfeld, supra note 187, at 855–56 (1999) (discussing indigency within tax
contexts). Although, it is possible that low income taxpayers suffer more in the aggregate
from civil assessment because, among other factors, the IRS targets taxpayers for audit based
on areas where errors on returns are common. Id. Taxpayers such as these would be unlikely
to have their tax returns prepared professionally, leaving a greater likelihood of error. Id.
204
See id. (emphasizing the cost of tax litigation, which has the potential of being
prohibitively expensive for persons of normal means).
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complexity of the case, some defendants with moderate means might be
considered indigent for the purposes of the litigation if hiring counsel
adequate to the case would be beyond such means. 205 Courts distinguish
a taxpayer capable of hiring counsel who decides against doing so from a
taxpayer who cannot afford to hire an attorney to properly advocate on
his behalf.206
While it is true that many taxpayers may, strictly speaking, be able to
find the money to hire a tax attorney for some period of time, they should
not be forced to choose between complete destitution and having their
taxes properly assessed.207 This interpretation is the contribution of this
Note; it is not proposing an additional test for due process analysis, nor is
it proposing an independent statute providing counsel to all taxpayers in
Tax Court.208 Rather, this Note seeks to contribute the interpretation that
indigent taxpayers can meet the preexisting standards for appointment of
counsel under due process despite not facing the risk of incarceration. 209
Granted, this is an unprecedented extension of the Due Process Clause
into civil litigation.210 However, the circumstances surrounding disputes
in the Tax Court justify such an extension.211

205
See id. (suggesting an indigency determination that balances the taxpayer’s resources
with those necessary to adequately litigate a given dispute). Indigency should be
distinguished from a defendant deciding it is simply uneconomic to hire counsel. See
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 460–68 (1938) (discussing waiver of the Sixth Amendment’s
right to access to counsel). A wealthy taxpayer facing an unfounded deficiency action for
twenty dollars may choose to pay the deficiency rather than hire an attorney to dispute it.
Id. That is not to say this taxpayer could not hire counsel if he chose to. In this hypothetical,
he merely decides to spend his money in a different way and submits to the IRS claim. Id.
Similarly, this wealthy taxpayer could decide against hiring an attorney to fully dispute an
IRS claim but still decide to challenge the claim pro se. Id. Perhaps he sees the marginal
benefit of the lawyer’s advocacy over and above his own as less than the lawyer’s estimated
cost, or perhaps he has always wanted to argue before a court. Id. Regardless, he was capable
of hiring counsel but simply chose not to. Id.
206
See Schoenfeld, supra note 187, at 855 (mentioning circumstances where it is uneconomic
to hire a tax professional for a given dispute—when the professional’s fee would exceed the
potential liability).
207
See Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339–40 (attempting to clarify the bounds of indigency and
intimating that the requirement fell short of complete destitution).
208
See supra Part III.A (applying due process analysis to Tax Court litigants).
209
See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2517–20 (2011) (applying the “distinct factors” to
determine if due process required the appointment of counsel); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976) (using “distinct factor” due process analysis).
210
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (emphasizing the limited nature of appointment of counsel
under the Due Process Clause).
211
See supra Part II (describing law surrounding tax litigation and appointment of counsel).
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The Due Process Clause Can Remain Limited While Allowing This
One Extension

It is not unreasonable to argue that extending state-appointed counsel
to civil litigation is a dangerous precedent to establish. 212 This is an
understandable concern, but as discussed above, state-appointed counsel
has already been extended to a narrow range of civil disputes.213
Furthermore, courts do not ordinarily provide counsel to indigent parties
in civil proceedings because civil lawsuits are generally between private
parties and because the litigants do not risk losing their liberty. 214 With
regard to the first, it would indeed prove improper and administratively
impossible for courts to begin analyzing how much each party is spending
on legal representation and attempting to ensure both parties receive an
“equal” representation before the court.215 This is not the situation before
the Tax Court, however.216 All disputes before the Tax Court are between
a taxpayer and the government, and began because the IRS made a
demand of the taxpayer.217 The second consideration is more important—
that civil proceedings do not generally place any party at risk of losing
liberty.218 Understandably, these are placed under less procedural
scrutiny than when a criminal defendant runs the risk of incarceration or
other severe limitations on his liberty as a citizen.219 While it is true civil
tax deficiencies do not threaten any lack of liberty if the taxpayer loses, the
IRS haling an indigent taxpayer into court and forcing him to choose
between accepting a debt not dischargeable in bankruptcy or attempting
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (keeping the due process to appointed counsel limited).
See supra Part II.B.2 (describing usage of state-appointed counsel in some civil cases
involving incarceration).
214
See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. at 26–27 (1981) (holding that a presumption
exists against requiring appointed counsel when an unsuccessful litigant cannot be deprived
of his personal liberty); see also Dick Jr., supra note 137, at 627 (evaluating the Supreme Court’s
approach to appointed counsel in civil proceedings and suggesting different treatment
when, inter alia, the state is the opposing party).
215
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting out factors to guide judicial
appointment of counsel that does not even contemplate proceedings between private parties,
but rather assumes the action would be brought by the state against a private individual).
216
See Froelich, supra note 35, at 340–44 (describing available forums for tax disputes).
217
See id. (explaining various options available to a taxpayer presented with a Notice of
Deficiency).
218
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25 (“The pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this
Court’s precedents on an indigent’s right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been
recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation.”).
219
See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union . . . secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”); see also
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26 (“[A]s a litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his
right to appointed counsel.”).
212
213

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/7

Pappas: Wrestling Antaeus: The Necessity of Appointed Counsel in Civil Ta

2016]

Wrestling Antaeus

243

to defend himself in an area of the law that most lawyers do not
understand does not resemble a fair dispute between two private
parties.220 In fact, it almost begins to resemble a government taking.221
Further extension of appointed counsel to indigent tax defendants
before the Tax Court would not significantly widen the limited precedent
of court-appointed counsel in civil cases, partly because of the potential
infrequency of such defendants and partly because the IRS already
provides funding to such defendants indirectly. 222 There is also sufficient
ambiguity between civil and criminal tax investigation where providing
counsel on both sides of the dividing line could reduce procedural costs
and uncertainties associated with (1) determining exactly when a civil
assessment becomes a criminal investigation; (2) when Miranda rights
must be read to the defendant; and (3) when counsel must be appointed
and potentially withdrawn.223
The Supreme Court’s extreme caution and hesitation in finding
generalized due process requirements, as well as specific extensions of the
right to court-appointed counsel reflects the valid concern that extending
paid counsel into civil litigation is a dangerous and difficult-to-control

220
See IRM § 9.5.13.2 (2009) (listing only monetary penalties); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2012)
(designating debt for a tax or customs duty non-dischargeable); see also Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (extending the federal due process guarantee of counsel
in criminal proceedings to the states based, in part, on the fundamentally unfair nature of
the government haling a citizen incapable of providing for his own legal defense into court).
221
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation”); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–19 (1992)
(discussing law surrounding government takings). Unfortunately, constitutional law
surrounding takings is not ultimately of much use when looking at tax proceedings because
much of it focuses on what constitutes a taking. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015–19 (analyzing at
what point property is over-burdened with regulation to the point where the regulation
constitutes a taking of the property). Taxes are necessarily a complete taking of one’s
monetary property. While tax comparison to takings in this Note focuses more on the seizure
of property without affording due process, the Court has acknowledged special
circumstances surrounding indigents in proceedings where the government holds the
exclusive remedy. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382–83 (1971) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause prevents states from denying indigents the
ability to obtain a divorce due to inability to pay court fees and costs, partly because of the
state monopoly on the means by which one can dissolve a marriage); but see United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445–46 (1973) (declining to extend Boddie to indigents in bankruptcy
proceedings because government did not hold the exclusive remedy for adjusting legal
relationships with creditors—the debtor could also negotiate adjustments). In the case of
taxes, it seems beyond question that the government holds the exclusive means of resolution.
222
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1190 n.110 (questioning the existence of indigent taxpayers
suspected of tax evasion); Low Income Tax Clinics, supra note 13 (describing the IRS’s LITC
program).
223
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1185–86 (examining the line between civil and criminal tax
offenses).
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precedent.224 It would likely be untenable for the government to provide
counsel for everyone’s private civil disputes.225 The Sixth Amendment
guarantees counsel only in criminal prosecutions, and the Due Process
Clause only extends that right to a fraction of civil cases involving
incarceration.226 Extending the right this much further would not greatly
burden the system of state-appointed attorneys, nor would it easily invite
further extensions.227 Civil tax assessment before the United States Tax
Court is a comparatively niche area of the law where the IRS is always a
party and the subject matter always concerns civil tax claims. 228 The Tax
Court itself encourages attorney representation by limiting transparency
and oversight and by effectuating a categorical disadvantage to pro se
litigants, despite almost half of the defendants litigating in this way. 229
One might also point to the public defender system as it currently
operates and ask why that requires expansion.230 Most current public
defender offices are underfunded, undervalued, and relatively
ineffectual.231 This is true, but does not mitigate a constitutional right to
counsel. It is rather a critique of the proper execution of an admittedly
necessary aspect of our jurisprudential system.232 The proper solution lies
in remedying the public defender system itself, not in refusing to extend
its conceptual paradigm to other areas of the law where due process
requires it.233
224
Cf. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2011) (keeping right of appointed counsel
very limited).
225
Cf. id. (declining to extend the right of appointed counsel beyond constitutional
requirements).
226
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“in all criminal prosecutions”); see also Turner, 131 S. Ct. at
2510 (clarifying just how limited precedent is for extending the right of appointed counsel).
227
Cf. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2510 (asserting the limited scope of appointed counsel under
due process).
228
See Froelich, supra note 35, at 327–32 (providing an overview of the tax reporting and
enforcement system).
229
See Lederman & Hrung, supra note 10, at 1281–82 (demonstrating an advantage to
counsel in Tax Court and observing that almost half of taxpayers in Tax Court represent
themselves pro se).
230
See, e.g., Jacob Gershman, Florida Judge in Courthouse Brawl is a Retired Army Reserve
Colonel, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/06/03/florida-judge-incourthouse-brawl-is-a-retired-army-colonel [https://perma.cc/FD6Z-CZXU] (revealing
video footage of a judge and a public defender stepping outside a courtroom during
proceedings to engage in a fist fight).
231
See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 85–88 (1995) (examining the current public defender system and
noting the challenges of working as a public defender as well as making suggestions as to
how the system can be improved).
232
See id. (discussing institutional problems with the public defender system).
233
See id. (demonstrating problems with the implementation of the public defender
system, not critiquing the premise behind it).
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One might also argue that, in a time when the Federal Government is
in a fantastic amount of debt, it may not be wise to saddle it with even
more financial obligations.234 As discussed above, the financial burden of
providing paid counsel to indigent tax defendants is unlikely to be
unbearable based on the probable infrequency of taxpayers being
considered truly indigent, and the IRS already allocating funds toward the
representation of those taxpayers.235 For the indigent taxpayers who exist,
it is the government’s duty, as the sovereign and provider of a just judicial
system, to ensure they receive their rights afforded to them by the Due
Process Clause.236
B. Appointing Counsel to Indigent Taxpayers under § 1915(d)
Federal statute enables trial courts to appoint counsel to any party. 237
This statutory appointment is placed at the discretion of the trial judge,
but does not skirt around the indigency requirement. 238 Rather, the statute
only allows a court to appoint counsel to a party “unable to employ
counsel.”239 While this requirement keeps usage of the statute somewhat
limited on its own, the appellate courts have also provided additional
guidance to help district courts determine whether to appoint counsel to
an indigent party under this statute. 240 In an attempt to help guide the
application of § 1915(d) to the Tax Court, this Note will examine two tests:
the Maclin test and the Farmer test.241
234
See US Debt Clock, http://www.usdebtclock.org [https://perma.cc/T7JV-RCFC]
(identifying United States national debt at approximately $19,058,852,850,000). With the
National Debt over nineteen-trillion dollars at the time of this writing, money-saving
arguments appear to receive fair consideration, at least in the political arena. Id. Even if this
is the case, providing a just and stable jurisprudential system is one of the central functions
of government. Doing so properly is of the utmost importance.
235
See Ise, supra note 11, at 1190 n.110 (wondering whether taxpayers suspected of tax
evasion could qualify as indigent); Low Income Tax Clinics, supra note 13 (referencing IRS’s
LITC program).
236
See supra Part III.A (proposing the Tax Court appoint counsel to indigent taxpayers);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law”).
237
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (authorizing courts to “request an attorney to represent any such
person unable to employ counsel”).
238
See id. (granting trial judges discretionary authority to appoint counsel).
239
Id. See also United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793–94 (9th Cir. 1965) (noting that
“the appointment of counsel in a civil case is, as is the privilege of proceeding in forma
pauperis, a matter within the discretion of the district court. It is a privilege and not a
right . . . In civil actions for damages, appointment of counsel should only be allowed in
exceptional cases”).
240
See Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1993) (abandoning the multi-factor test
laid out in Maclin and providing an alternative inquiry).
241
See Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1981) (describing a method of
determining when it is appropriate for courts to appoint counsel under § 1915(d)).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2016], Art. 7

246

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

When using the Maclin test to determine if appointing counsel under
§ 1915(d) is proper, a trial court considers several factors: (1) whether the
plaintiff’s claim has some merit, (2) the indigent litigant’s ability to
investigate the facts without the assistance of counsel, (3) the complexity
of the evidence, (4) the indigent litigant’s ability to represent himself, and
(5) the difficulty of the legal issues. 242 Some taxpayers would certainly fit
this requirement in litigation before the Tax Court.243 There are plenty of
non-frivolous claims to bring in tax law and many of those may be more
complicated—either in regard to fact, law, or both—than a lay person may
be able to adequately manage.244
While applying this test would help indigent taxpayers, Judge Posner
has identified some problems with it.245 First, if a case fails the first factor
of the Maclin test, the case should simply be dismissed out of hand; there
would be no need to worry about appointing counsel. 246 Next, the second
and third factors blend together into one consideration of whether the
indigent litigant is able to effectively present evidence.247 Lastly, the
fourth factor is dependent on the second, third, and fifth factors, turning
those into partial subparts of the fourth.248 Thus, while some courts still
follow the Maclin test, the Seventh Circuit adopted a simpler one in
Farmer.249
In applying the Farmer test, courts ask three questions: (1) has the
indigent plaintiff made reasonable efforts to retain counsel or been
effectively precluded from making such efforts before reaching
appointment; (2) given the difficulty of the case, did the plaintiff appear
to be competent to try it himself; and (3) if not, would the presence of
counsel have made a difference in the outcome.250 This test is clearer than
the Maclin test and could also apply to certain taxpayers in Tax Court. 251
The first factor could be satisfied by the Court simply determining actual

See id. (laying out the Maclin test).
Cf. id. (presenting a test that could apply to any litigant who met the criteria).
244
Cf. id. (laying out a § 1915(d) test involving consideration of the complexity of a party’s
legal claim).
245
See Farmer, 990 F.2d 319, 321–22 (critiquing the Maclin test, as well as multi-factor
balancing tests more generally).
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
See id. (criticizing the Maclin test and asserting the superiority of the Farmer test as an
alternative).
250
See Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (outlining the simplified test set out
in Farmer).
251
See id. at 657–58 (applying the Farmer test).
242
243
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indigency for the purposes of counsel. 252 Similarly, the third factor could
be satisfied by simply showing an attorney would do a better job of
Recalling Professor
representation than the taxpayer himself. 253
Lederman’s showing that attorneys presented a statistically significant
advantage in litigated disputes before the Tax Court, one would almost
expect cases to satisfy this factor.254 The second factor is probably the most
difficult to judge, but tax law is complicated—certainly some taxpayers
will be faced with an issue too complicated to adequately advocate on
their own behalf.255
Thus, even if the Tax Court is not ultimately convinced that due
process guarantees its indigent taxpayers appointed counsel, or if it is
overly concerned about an unprecedented expansion of the Due Process
Clause, it could still serve well the Constitution and the people of the
United States by liberally applying the Farmer test on a case-by-case
basis.256 This is the second aspect of this Note’s contribution: the liberal
interpretation of § 1915(d) such that it applies to Tax Court litigants. 257
This second interpretive contribution comes as an alternative to the first;
even if the Tax Court is unwilling to accept this Note’s earlier
interpretation of the Due Process Clause, it can still appoint counsel to
indigent taxpayers by accepting this interpretation of § 1915(d).258 In an
area of the law as complicated as tax, where there exist enough lowincome taxpayers for the IRS to fund clinics, and where empirical data
demonstrate the assistance of counsel has a meaningful effect on litigation,
the Tax Court is perfectly situated to exercise its discretion as a court of
law to implement the authority given to it by § 1915(d) to ensure
“fundamental fairness.”259
Appointing counsel to indigent taxpayers before the Tax Court would
acknowledge and address the conjoined nature of tax investigation while
252
See id. at 654–55 (asking, as the first factor, whether the indigent plaintiff made
reasonable efforts to retain counsel or has been effectively precluded from doing so).
253
See id. at 657–58 (asserting the notion that an appointment of counsel not be futile before
doing so).
254
See Lederman & Hrung, supra note 10, at 1281–82 (providing data showing attorney
representation in Tax Court tends to make a difference in litigated outcomes).
255
Cf. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654 (discussing the competency of a plaintiff to represent himself
in complicated legal matters).
256
Cf. id. (discussing a § 1915 appointment of counsel, guided by “sound legal principles”).
257
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (2012) (giving trial courts broad discretion to appoint counsel
to litigants).
258
See supra Part III.A (arguing the Due Process Clause should be read to apply to indigent
taxpayers in Tax Court); see also § 1915(e)(1) (authorizing courts to appoint counsel at their
discretion).
259
See supra Part II.A (discussing the complex nature of tax law and Lederman’s data
demonstrating an attorney advantage in litigated outcomes before the Tax Court); see also
Low Income Tax Clinics, supra note 13 (describing the IRS’s LITC program).
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also satisfying existing due process requirements. 260 It would diminish
the categorical bias suffered by pro se defendants.261 It would encourage
a more consistent scheme of enforcement by ensuring cases are not
decided solely on the defendant’s inexperience and lack of resources.262 It
would help keep the Tax Court and the IRS honest despite any potential
problems with incentives, oversight, or an abundance of discretion. 263
Taxpayers facing civil action by the IRS deserve more than an
opportunity to get lost in the enigmatic labyrinth of the Internal Revenue
Code before having their taxes improperly assessed. Tax enforcement has
never been extraordinarily clear on where a civil action ends and criminal
prosecution begins, and that problem has persisted to this day in areas
such as tax fraud.264 The Tax Court has likewise faced difficulties in
categorization and authority, and by its very operation seems to
perpetuate the idea of tax exceptionalism, for better or worse.265 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged some bleed between civil and criminal
law in certain circumstances, and has recognized a right to paid counsel
in particular civil situations.266 This Note advocates the recognition of that
right in one other situation—one in which the subject matter, parties, and
forum all lend themselves to its extension.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the IRS perhaps lacks the ancestry and malice of Antaeus, it
does not lack for his strength. The power of the IRS serves well to ensure
government revenue—like the skulls which adorned Antaeus’s temple to
Poseidon, the reach and reputation of the IRS serves as a warning to those
260
See supra Part II.A (describing the current methods of tax fraud investigation and tax
audits generally).
261
See supra notes 58, 188 and accompanying text (referencing Professor Lederman’s data
showing a significant bias in favor of the IRS in litigated outcomes before the Tax Court).
262
See supra notes 258–61 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances when a
court could appoint counsel, at least in part, for the benefit of the precedent and the
development of the law). Presumably, the best adjudicative tax policy would emerge from
a continuous dialectic involving zealous and capable advocates on both sides of an issue. Id.
In this way, ensuring all litigants had access to adequate counsel would ensure the best
arguments supporting each position are provided to the Court to consider and balance them
appropriately. Id. Tax law would reap the benefit of this policy consideration regardless if
the Tax Court appointed counsel to indigent taxpayers on the basis of due process or its own
discretion. Id.
263
See supra Part II.A (detailing perceived problems surrounding the Tax Court’s
independence and transparency as well as the IRS’s mandate affording it substantial
discretion).
264
See supra Part II.A (outlining the blurred historical treatment of taxes regarding civil
and criminal aspects).
265
See supra Part II.A (describing the Tax Court’s development and classification).
266
See supra Part II.B (outlining case law surrounding the appointment of counsel).
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who would defraud the government—but it must not be allowed to grow
so far as to impinge upon individual constitutional guarantees. Taxpayers
before the Tax Court may not face incarceration, but they are still pitted
against the might of the federal government in a very complicated area of
the law. To allow the government the potential ability of wrongfully
seizing a taxpayer’s property merely because the government is not also
threatening to seize his person is to dramatically over-constrain the
constitutional guarantee of due process.
As Herakles performed his labors, he tamed and controlled various
dangers, making the world a safer and more civilized place. The law
shares a similar mandate: to establish justice, to promote the general
welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty. The Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment serves to constrain the government from becoming
a terror to the citizens it seeks to protect. To that end, the Tax Court should
appoint counsel to represent those unable to do so themselves.
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